Wednesday, 3 December 2014

Plato’s Critique about democracy Democracy is the worst form of government



Plato’s Republic vs. Democracy
Ogochukwu Okpala

Introduction

In this era when individuals are questioning the legitimacy and wisdom of unregulated free markets, issues are raised about the most efficient form of economic activity and the best role for government in an economy. These issues have been discussed at many points in the past, and different societies have come to different conclusions regarding political and economic systems. In the United States, and many developed nations around the world, the view has often been that democracy accompanied by capitalism, offers the best, most efficient use of resources and governments guided by those principles assure the best outcomes for their populations.
Other countries have adopted very different governing principles. Communist doctrine, as adopted by some nations, endorses the establishment of an egalitarian, classless, stateless society based on common ownership of the means of production and property
( Communism: The failure of an utopian system, 2008). The civilization is governed by an individual, or individuals, whose function is to ensure the efficiency of the society as a whole. As an ideal, the communist doctrine defines a just city as one that eliminates the need for its citizens to wish to exploit each other. History appears to indicate that in practice, however, the communist vision cannot be fulfilled since “absolute power ( which is given to the leader) corrupts absolutely” (Martin,  2009).
Human nature does not appear to manage total supremacy well.
When authorities are left unchallenged, their characters appear to be altered, inverting their true selves with alter egos incapable of putting the welfare of others before their own.
History provides examples of autocrats who brought tragedy and
devastation to the people that they governed. Many were appointed in an attempt to bring relief in times of turmoil, but ended up by using their political prowess to dictate and oppress. Adolf Hitler, once a social misfit, became one of history’s most infamous tyrants whose attainment of power spiraled from the aftermath of the Treaty of Versailles (Hitler’s foreign policy, 2007). Against the backdrop of these various choices made by different nations throughout history, democracies have viewed the choice of that political system as obviously superior. Current events, however, once again raise questions about the optimal means of governance and the optimal form of economic activity that accompanies it.
While the track record of ruling individuals, or classes, is
somewhat spotty, the concept of a ruling elite finds a strong proponent in the philosopher Plato. While recognizing the fundamental flaw in humankind so clearly manifested in the “Hitlers” of the world, Plato believed in the appointment of one supreme guardian (the philosopher king), an individual, who with the proper education, was competent enough to decide on legislative policies. In Plato’s work The Republic, such a knowledgeable being determines the laws in the city. Plato believed that the philosopher king was incorruptible since his only desire was knowledge (his thirst for knowledge surmounting that of any vice).
In spite of history’s lessons, is it plausible to believe that a society can be governed in such a manner? Or is democracy, “[where] the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must” (Boyle, 2007) , the ideal form of governance when the true nature of humankind is considered? Further, given the current and past crises arising out of capitalism accompanied by democracy, could it be true that democracy is no less flawed than those other forms of governance? Plato’s arguments, made so long ago, resonate in the current world in much the same way as they did when they first appeared. Times of crisis remind us of the need for ongoing review of the assumptions we make regarding the best way to govern and the best way to manage those scarce resources available to us. Plato provided one view of the best form of government, and consequently, offers some insight into the issues under review today.

The Just State

The Republic was arguably Plato’s most influential work. It portrays several dialogues between the philosopher Socrates and several observers in which they discuss a political theory for a just state. The central belief is that “justice and happiness stand and fall together. Not because good consequences…follow from being just, but because justice itself is so great that nothing gained by injustice could be greater” (Boyle, 2007).
Socrates unified a just person and a just city, claiming that an
individual’s soul contains three parts (three desires). The first part is the desire for wisdom and truth, the second for honor, and the last for gains. The individual’s parts correspond to those of a city’s. The portion of the soul that desires wisdom and truth is the principle role of the guardians of a city. The portion that desires honor is the principle role of the auxiliaries. The last portion that desires gains is the principle role of the producing class.
Socrates believes that “guardians” should run a city because
they are the only ones with the knowledge and the desire to do so. When contrasting this doctrine to the democratic process in American society, the question is raised as to whether Socrates’ republic would be more practical. A democracy allows for virtually all to take part in the election of a leader (with the possible exceptions of children, illegal immigrants and convicts). Campaigns may span years during which candidates debate in a national forum. Interviews are held to allow voters to gain knowledge of the candidates’ policies.
In spite of this, how many Americans evaluate all policies and
subsequently vote based on what is relevant to them? In fact, how many Americans understand the relevance of so many events that would allow them to make a truly informed decision? The media portray a narrowminded view of the world, showing only portions of what could impact life in the States. Many people knew nothing about Afghanistan and the injustices forced upon its people by the Taliban, until the events of 9/11. If people are not fully informed about events, domestic and foreign, then how can they understand any candidate’s proposed policies?
Without complete and relevant information, the American
democratic election process becomes a popularity contest. People favor the charismatic contender whether he is the best candidate or not. Is this how a country should be governed? To allow the public to vote based on emotions rather than an informed decision could be detrimental to the structure of a society. The logical conclusion is that it may be best to allow those who are truly informed (the wise) to determine what is best for the group.
Those individuals who might disagree with such an idea on
the basis that it is undemocratic should be advised that such practices already occur in democratic states. By its nature, a democracy allows for elected leadership to make decisions for the group. Events are concealed from the public at large for a variety of reasons, homeland security being a popular rationale currently. Given the power that this endows in a leadership, it stands to reason that such a leadership should be made up of the best, most informed, minds available.

Plato’s View of Democracy

Plato showed no fondness for democracy (where power is held by the people) because he believed that not all members of society were capable of making wise decisions. As voiced through Socrates, the Platonic principle is that only a few people in a just city (those individuals known as the philosophers) possess the principle portion of the soul that desires for truth and wisdom. Since this portion forms the majority of the philosophers’ souls, these individuals will primarily strive for truth and wisdom. Furthermore, since this portion of their souls is also rational, this ruling cadre will be just, assuring that the city they rule is also just.
Justice does not form the basis of rule in a capitalistic society,
and by extension, will have a lesser role in a democratic republic. In a capitalistic system, where free markets (uncontrolled by the government) are endorsed, buyers and sellers come together in the exchange of goods and services. Money has a large influence in this society. America’s strength lies in its wealth. It plays a role in United States (U.S.) foreign policy tools (where sanctions and embargos are used to coerce other nations), and in U.S. domestic affairs (where tax policies and government contracts spread wealth to specific groups of citizens).
Plato did not believe in money because he understood its power
to corrupt. He believed that a society would be happier without it. When questioned how the city would defend itself without money, Socrates replied in The Republic that neighboring cities would come to their aid when promised the spoils of war. In contrast today, in the name of advancing democracy, war may be viewed as a source of increasing national wealth; manipulating oil sources in Iraq is justified since the country’s government was overthrown to be remade in an image viewed as preferable.
Leaders not motivated by justice will find ways to rationalize
immoral actions, or inactions, using the ends (increased wealth or control) to justify the means. Instances of inaction include the examples of the lack of attention paid to countries like Darfur and Rwanda where genocide occurs while the Western world turns a blind eye. Democratic nations see no political gain to be had from interference in foreign governments where innocent people suffer but no wealth or control is to be gained.
The Republic proposed the view that morality outweighs
rationality. If money and wealth are not at the forefront of society’s value system, morality dictates that all societies will be on an equal footing. In consequence, a society will have fewer wars since there would not be financial gains to be desired and mutual respect across nations would forbid war being used as a means of control of other nations.

Leadership Determination

A distinction between the democratic state and Plato’s Republic lies in the appointment of its leaders. “Democratic elections are....competitive, periodic, inclusive, definitive elections in which the chief decisionmakers in a government are selected by citizens who enjoy broad freedom to criticize government, to publish their criticism and to present alternatives” (What is democracy?, 2008). In a democracy, after the candidates have campaigned and voiced their policies, the people are called upon to vote.
In the U.S. version of democracy, people do not vote directly for
a president. They are in fact voting for an elector who is a part of the Electoral College. The elector then votes for the candidate to whom he or she is pledged. The candidate with the largest number of electoral votes wins the Presidency. This indirect method of choosing who fills the highest office in the land may work well but relies on electors fulfilling their pledge and may create distrust in voters. In the election of Bush versus Gore, where each candidate was declared the winner at different intervals, confidence in the system was severely strained. Greater transparency and clarity in the system might create greater trust in the voting public and greater confidence in the outcome. Further, the question raised earlier regarding the motives of democratic leaders that value gain more than morality, is likely to lead to distrust in the population. Leaders motivated by wealth are susceptible to temptation and may not be trusted to do the right thing.
A system like that electoral system used in U.S. presidential
elections is not consistent with Plato’s vision on two levels. First, the average individual may not have the wisdom to be involved in the appointment of a leader and second, potential leaders’ abilities should be carefully and objectively scrutinized before nomination. Those individuals that Plato described as “guardians” are the only ones with the knowledge, wisdom and virtue to run a just city. They are the ones with the education and the thirst for knowledge to make decisions based on morals rather than emotions.
Moreover, of all the guardians, one particular philosopher is
needed to govern the city: the philosopher-king. In the Platonic system, guardians were subjected to several tests in order to determine which of that select group could be that king. The most important test was their grasp of the idea of the “Form of the Good” (described by Socrates as “beyond being”- the origin of life). Through their understanding of this idea, the selected guardian would reach the highest level of knowledge and be capable of becoming the philosopher-king.
This ruler was described as the supreme ruler who is at the top
of a hierarchy, followed by the auxiliaries, and finally the producing class. For Plato, this described the perfect society—a leadership capable of, and a system designed to optimize the happiness of its citizens.
The strength of Plato’s political vision is not dissimilar from
that of a democratic, capitalistic system in that it recognizes the strength of reward to motivate behavior. Where it differs is that that the guardians were not to be rewarded with private wealth, given their natures (carefully selected individuals) their reward was what they most desired, that is truth and wisdom. Such a city was designed to be free of corruption. The auxiliaries, whose primary desire was for honor, act as helpers to the guardians and police the producing class who are those who desire gain.
All parts of the city are rewarded with what they most desire
and each sector’s desire guarantees the overall happiness of all. These rewards are not monetary, as there is no money in the city, thereby removing a major source of corruption. A potential strength of a
Republic as envisioned by Plato is that it is governed by a small group. With few in leadership roles, it is easy to congregate, set an agenda and come to a united agreement. This government of small numbers allows for order and unity.

Weaknesses of the Platonic Ideal and of Democracy

The weakness of Plato’s vision is that it requires exceptionally high standards for the moral nature of human beings. In this view, Plato puts a great deal of emphasis on the soul as rational and assumes that people, who choose occupations based on their desires, will be just.
What about those who use their passions to deceive and
manipulate? For instance, “Machiavellians…check their passions so that they can practice even greater injustice” (Boyle, 2007). According to Plato’s doctrine, given that they are following the desires of their rational soul, they must be behaving in a just manner. Another weakness of this doctrine is that it puts too much power in the hands of a selected few. It is dangerous to allow so few to govern so many. Without the checks and balances seen in a democratic society, an environment of tyranny is fostered.
In contrast, a weakness of democracy is that the masses are
given the ability to govern the country. As a group, they are susceptible to a “group think” mentality; voting based on the collective mentality rather than individual ideals. Economic gain is central in a capitalist society and will influence people’s decision making. The group may vote based on emotions rather than thought. Also, a large number of people may be unable to focus on one agenda since different people have different ideals, agendas and motivations. That said, it may be safer to leave power in the hands of the many rather than the hands of the few and collectively people may object to that which seems tyrannical.
Plato’s doctrine seems to center around “theocracy…militarism,
nationalism, hierarchy, liberalism, totalitarianism, and the complete disdain of economic structures of society” (Boyle, 2007) . A republic such as this has never existed, making it an ideal. The dilemma with idealism is that it is counter-intuitive to reality. Ideals may not function in reality. They serve more as a moral compass than an actual function basis of governance. So what is the solution? The best form of governance is that which combines idealism and realism.

What Is the Ideal Form of Governance?

Is the best form of governance the original form of democracy, as mapped by the founding fathers, grounded by economic realities regarding the greed of some individuals, rather than the democracy of today where unfettered capitalism creates periodic crisis? The current interpretation of democracy appears to work better for some members of society than others and often democratic ideals are sacrificed (again for some) in order to accommodate the so-called free markets which appear to be freer for some then they are for others.
The founding fathers believed that in an ideal society those who own property, have an income and meet age requirements, should govern the country and fight its wars. The reason is that they are the individuals who have the most to lose. In today’s society, the vast majority of these people would be the middle class. They pay the majority of the nation’s taxes and own a large proportion of its land. Because of this, the middle class would fight harder in wars and choose a leader whose policies are best for the collective. Following this argument, the poor should not vote because they may not truly be informed about politics and have less to lose should poor decisions about leadership be made. Their primary concern is likely to be to vote for leaders who would distribute more aid to them.
Again reality intrudes on such an argument. The middle class
shows no sign of an inclination to sign up for military life to defend their way of life. Rather they are content to allow the poor to do so. And the middle class is no less likely to vote to promote their own welfare than the poor, regardless of what might be in the best interests of the nation overall. Relegating the poor to the sidelines of power raises the specter of racism as well, an ongoing American problem. Poverty is frequently identified with black and Hispanic citizens and a larger proportion of those citizens are likely to be poor. The ideal of democracy, as originally envisioned, would serve to amplify the problems of racism, alienate a large group of minority families from the political process and further drive a wedge between the races. The reality of economics again intrudes on the historic democratic ideal.

Conclusion

In modern America, it is best that all people participate in their society’s governance. In spite of Plato’s arguments and any inconvenience and inefficiency, placing the reins of democracy in the hands of the masses is safer than relegating power to only a few. Plato was correct in requiring that leaders be informed, and equally correct in believing that the uniformed masses are less likely to make good decisions, but the way to address this is not to exclude people. Rather, as part of the political process, people should be educated about all of the facets of the process, as well as about the candidates, their policies and political ideologies.
In addition to education about the candidates and the process,
the population requires a more general education in order to allow it to follow its desires, in terms of career and the contribution that each individual might make to society. As in The Republic, allowing people to perform jobs which best suit their desires would give each individual a stake in the welfare of the nation overall, allowing for a more efficient use of labor resources and a motivation for all members of society to work for the collective good of the whole.
Given the economic realities of capitalism, where some have
resources to manipulate the government in their own best interests, modern democracy requires some reining in of free markets. The reality of greed and the existence of those who would put their own desires before the welfare of the nation overall, necessitate a government that regulates those who control more resources. In other words, economic realities cannot be ignored or wished away as in a Platonic ideal. But just as the communist ideal seems somewhat naïve in a modern era, so is the concept of unfettered capitalism as the only efficient economic system.
The greatest contribution of Plato to our modern understanding of appropriate governance may be the emphasis the philosopher placed on the power of knowledge and wisdom. Some investment in those attributes might allow for a better informed voter and a more reasonable form of government where democratic ideal is blended with an understanding of economic necessity and the realities of human nature. Perhaps what has become most apparent from the current crisis is that some sense of collective good, as well as a sense of collective responsibility, must be incorporated into the notion of democracy.

References

Boyle, B. (2007). Platonic thoughts. Wilson Quarterly. 31, 107-108.
Communism: The failure of an utopian system. (2008). ThinkQuest.
Retrieved October 25, 2008 from Oracle Education Foundation: http://library.thinkquest.org/07aug/00858/en/index.html.
Hitler’s foreign policy. (2007). BBC Home. Retrieved November 17, 2008, from http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/h2g2/alabaster/A828317.
Martin, G. (2009). Meanings and origins of phrases and sayings. The Phrase Finder. Retrieved November 5, 2008, from http://www.phrases.org.uk/meanings/288200.html.
Okpala, O, A (2009, January, 25) [Interview with Chukwuemeka Okpala] (Unknown), (2008). What is democracy? Retrieved September 24, 2008, from International Information Program Web site: www.usinfo.state.gov

REVENUE ALLOCATION COMMISSIONS AND THE CONTRADICTIONS IN NIGERIA’S FEDERAL SYSTEM: A REVISITATION Orokpo, Ogbole F.E and Stephen, Makoji Robert Department of Public Administration Federal Polytechnic Idah, Kogi State



 

 

ABSTRACT 

One of the perennial problems which has not only defied all past attempts at permanent solution, but also has a tendency for evoking high emotions on the part of all concerned each time it is brought forth for discussion or analysis is the issue of equitable revenue allocation in Nigeria. It is an issue which has been politicised by successive administrations in Nigeria both military and civilian regimes. It is consequent on this that various regimes had attempted at establishing various commissions/committees on revenue allocations which attempted various criteria for sharing national revenue which have been distilled into a number of principles as enunciated in this paper. The imperative of competition over sharing common wealth in the context of a plural society like Nigeria have resulted into a lot of contradictions despite the plethora of commissions which is the focus of this paper. The paper among other things concludes that an acceptable formula that would foster a more balanced development and harmonious fiscal federalism among the component groups in the country is very fundamental.
Keywords: Federalism, Revenue Allocation, Fiscal Federalism, Revenue Allocation Commission

INTRODUCTION

According to Ojo (2010), the perennial problems which has not only defied all past attempts at permanent solution, but also has a tendency for evoking high emotions on the part of all concerned (each time it is brought forth for discussion or analysis) is the issue of equitable revenue allocation in Nigeria. It is an issue which has been politicised by successive administrations in Nigeria both military and civilian regimes. Indeed, in virtually all federations in which the constitution shares power between the central and regional or state governments and, for each level to be “within a sphere co-ordinate and independent” (Wheare 1963:93) enough resources need be allocated to each tier to justify their existence. The nature and conditions of the financial relations in federal systems particularly one that is transfixed on a multi-ethnic society like Nigeria is crucial to her continuing existence (Badmus 1989:7) for fiscal matters transcend the purview of economics alone. They have in most cases in Nigeria assumed political, religious and social dimensions (Adesina 1998:234). In the words of James O’Connor, allotments of money (and resources) must reflect “social and economic conflicts between classes and groups” (O’Connor 1993:276). It is not surprising therefore, that the basis of federal statutory revenue allocation has always been one of the “most contentious and destabilizing factors in the Nigerian polity”. No doubt, ‘public finance is one of those subjects which lie on the borderline between economics and politics’ (Dalton 1929 also cited in Ekeh 1994:234). It needs be emphasized that whatever may be the origin of a federation, whether aggregation or devolution, its establishment at once raises three salient problems: “how to allocate functions rationally; how to allocate taxing powers; and how to share revenue between the governments of that federation” (Phillips 1971:389 also cited in Adebayo 1990:246). Revenue allocation formula must accomplish via: (i) national unity; (ii) economic growth, (iii) balanced development, (iv) self-sufficiency and (v) high standard of living for the citizens (Nigerian Tribune editorial comment 11th August, 1995:1). The hitch however in Nigerian context is how best to resolve these complex revenue allocation problems that will achieve the aforementioned objectives. Thus, on several occasions, successive governments have been revising revenue allocation formula till date. So far, an acceptable formula is yet to be arrived at; in view of the agitations here and there for an acceptable formula. Meanwhile, it is imperative to note that Nigeria’s revenue sharing debates have revolved basically around three issues namely: (i) the relative proportions of federally collected revenues in the federation account that should be assigned to the centre, the states, the localities and the so-called ‘Special Funds’ (vertical revenue sharing), (ii) the appropriate formulae for the distribution of centrally devolved revenues among the states and among the localities i.e. local governments (horizontal revenue sharing) and (iii) the percentage of federally collected mineral revenue that should be returned to the oil-bearing states and communities on the account of the principle of derivation and compensation for the ecological risks of oil production (Suberu 1995:8-9). It is equally important to note that since the oil boom in the early 1970s, the revenue allocation formula has been bedevilled by time inconsistencies – a tendency of one of the parties in a consensual agreement to change the terms after the negotiations have been completed. The formula has been continually manipulated in the service of interregional and inter-ethnic cross-subsidization (Olopoenia 1998:51). Suffice to say that revenue allocation formula are warped because they are have not been ‘‘open covenants openly arrived at’’. Rather, they reflect the views of commissions, individuals, or groups within the commissions, which have shown proclivity for embracing theories, beliefs ideals and approaches which have not only proved unrealistic, but have thereby contributed to the dislocations within the Nigerian state (Adesina, 1998: 232). The historical analysis of the revenue allocation commissions is vitally important in unravelling the paradoxes our time, and to understand our contemporary predication. The thrust of this paper therefore is to access the challenges of evolving a viable revenue allocation formula cum commission vis-à-vis the contradictions in Nigeria’s federal system.

The Challenges of Revenue Allocation in Nigeria’s Federalism

In a federal system of government, revenue allocation involves two schemes. The first is the vertical sharing between the federal or inclusive government and the other tiers of governments. The subject of these sharing schemes is the federally collected revenues. This is because the revenues generated within the jurisdictional areas of the units – states and local governments – are not subject to the national sharing formula. 
In the annals of federal countries’ revenue sharing arrangements, the sources of the federally collected revenue that form the subject of the sharing formula have remained largely unchanged. These sources which are not amenable to other units include import duties,
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mining rents, excise units, export duties and royalties (Ovwasa, 1995:102-117). The implication of this is that, since these sources of revenue are not amenable to the jurisdiction of the other units of government, the problem of revenue allocation has focused on not who should raise the taxes, but on how to share the proceeds that is, the actual revenue collected by the federal government. The imbalance between functions and resources base, calls for higher level government to transfer revenue to the lower level. Graham in a perceptive work, described such transfer as “deficiency transfer or balancing” (Graham, 1964). It is so described because the transfer seeks to make up for the differences in the levels of functions devolved to the lower government and the resources available to it. Another principle of revenue transfer which is horizontal revenue sharing arises out of the variations in revenue generation capacities of the component units. Where the revenue raising capacities are low, heavier tax burden is imposed relative to higher revenue raising capacities area. This transfer is called “equalization transfer”. This transfer is necessary because higher taxation will scare away businesses and the economy of the unit will become more depressed. To avoid this, the higher the federal level of government has to transfer to the lower unit, the better, to enable it make up for the differences between its internally generated revenue and those required for maintaining the minimum standard of services.

The two types of resource transfer discussed above are known as intergovernmental grantsin-aid. The third principle has been given different names by different scholars. Beak (cited in Graham 1964) called it “simulation”, “incentive” or “conditional” grants. This grant is also known as categorical grants because such grants are designed basically to undertake certain projects. This is also known as categorical grants because they are desired for particular purposes. Nevertheless, in view of the fact that no federation has all its component parts equally developed, the transfer of funds within a federation is a potent weapon in the hands of mangers of the state more so in a plural society with diverse cleavages to satisfy hegemonic interests. On the other hand it can help in ensuring that all parts of the federation have resources to carry out their functions. The government can thus ensure that the revenue from resources located in a part of the country is used for the benefit of all parts (Nyemutu-Roberts 2005:328). To this extent, revenue allocations can foster national integration. However, when misused, it engenders political altercations and contestations which destabilise the political economy and tend to undermine the efficacy of federalism in fostering political accommodation and economic development. This is why the most common source of friction in a federation is the distribution of fiscal resources (Aluko 1976:1). It is important to add that fiscal relationship in a gamut of intergovernmental relations is no longer only federal-state but also state-federal, federal-local and state-local. This is one of the most significant recent trends in inter-governmental fiscal relationships in federal systems across all regions and climes of the world (Aluko 1976). In developing countries like Nigeria, studies have shown that the state and local governments rely mainly on allocations from the federal government (Ekpo, 1994; Olowononi 1998). The allocation from the federal government usually constitutes about 70 to 90 percent of the state or local government revenues. Some major implications of this dependence are that the situation of the local governments would be worse; the agitation for constant review of revenue allocations in favour of the States and local governments will persist and continue to be a major friction in the political equation of the country. Moreover, the States will remain inefficient in tax collection and consequently remain underdeveloped in tax and general revenue administration. All these will continue to generate unnecessary tension (Tella, 1999) as the case with Nigeria. According to Dunmoye (2002), four interrelated factors can initiate or ruin a viable federation. These are:- 
      the issue of political power sharing or representativeness especially at the centre; 
      the problem of equitable employment to members of all sectors or all constituent units in the federation;
      location of industries or infrastructures and projects especially those funded by the federal government and 
      The sharing of resources or what is known in Nigeria as revenue allocation. 
Each of these four is related to the whole gamut of the political economy of federalism. Any lapse in one or more of these factors can mar any federal system especially a fragile federation with a dependent capitalist polity like Nigeria. 

The debate on Nigeria’s fiscal federalism and relations hinges on the fundamental question of who gets what of the national cake, when and how. This is fundamental given that Nigeria as a monolithic economy gets over 80% of its revenue from crude oil, by virtue of the constitutional provision, this revenue must be disbursed to the three tiers of government. It also explains why the formula for revenue allocation has continued to be at the heart of public debate and why public office holders are hardly held accountable for the misuse of revenues derived from the national oil wealth. It is obvious that the nature and conditions of the financial relations in any federal system of government is crucial to the survival of such a system. A major source of inter-governmental disputes under a federal system centres on the problems of securing adequate financial resources on the part of the lower levels of government to discharge essential political and constitutional responsibilities (Olaloku, 1979:109). In all federations, there are always constitutional wrangling or how resources should be shared among the constituent units since there are always poor and relatively rich units for instance, in Nigeria, the poor units/regions/states often prefer a re-distributive system of federal resource while the richer or more endowed States are in favour of more financial autonomy and revenue allocation based on the relative contribution of each constituent units to the federal purse. In Nigeria revenue allocation largely implies the allocation of oil revenue, therefore, oil is central to the politics of inter-governmental fiscal relations thus, the contending forces over power and access to oil, extraction and accumulation of resources constitute the major conceptual issues that must be objectively confronted in seeking to understand the political economy of federalism in Nigeria and revenue allocation. 

Revenue Allocation Commissions and the Contradictions in Nigeria’s Federal System: A Review

The history of revenue allocation formula and commission all in an attempt to arrive at an acceptable sharing formula for Nigeria occurred long before independence. The first set of
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commissions was ad hoc in nature. The first commission ever set up by the colonial masters was in 1946. The name of the Commissioner was Phillipson. Recommendation of the commission was to take effect from 1948/49. The commission placed emphasis on three principles for revenue sharing, derivation, population and even progress. This period was characterized by strong federal government’s presence in fiscal matters (Olaloku 1979). The newly created regional councils at the time were allocated the residue or excess of the budgetary needs of the Central government because they had no legislative powers whatsoever. So they could not collect or appropriate revenue. By 1951, the recommendations of that Commission became unacceptable to Nigerians in general and nationalist leaders in particular and another one was set up that year known as Hicks Phillipson commission. This commission recommended three principles: Derivation, Needs and National Interest. The recommendation of this commission was to take effect in 1952/53 (Phillips 1971). It needs be added further that the regional councils during this period had the fiscal powers with independent revenues and tax jurisdictions with the aim of prompting a truly federal system. The Central Government now shared equally with the Regions (East, West and North), the centrally-collected revenue. The Regional portion of this revenue was in turn shared among the Regions largely on the basis of derivation. Mention must be made of the introduction of special grants to the Regions to take care of education and police protection (Phillips 1971, Omitola 2005:149). The major difference or departure of this commission with the previous one’s recommendation is that it de-emphasised population criterion.

In 1953, Chick`s Commission was raised to review the formula again. In its report, the commission adopted and emphasised the derivation principle as the basis of allocation of revenue to the Regions. For effective application of the derivation principle, the following weights were allocated for each region. Eastern and Northern Regions each had 30 percent while the Western Region had 40 percent (Omitola 2005). Still in search of acceptable revenue allocation formula in 1958, Raisman Commission was raised to review same. In its own recommendation it reduced considerably, the importance of principle of derivation, and retained the principle of fiscal autonomy for the Region; it emphasised that of needs with population used as an approximate index of fiscal needs and the basic responsibilities of the regional governments and the need for even-development of the country which it called “unified national policy”. This commission recommended further that the North which had over half of the country’s population was to receive 40 percent; Western Region was to receive 37 percent, Eastern Region 18 percent and Southern Cameroon 5 percent; while the Northern Region in addition received 1.5 million naira as compensation because the principle of derivation worked against it in the past. Six years later in 1964, Binns Commission did another review. This commission was established as a result of a realignment of boundaries. First, with the referendum that transferred Southern Cameroons to the Main Cameroon in 1961 and the creation of the Mid-Western Region from Western Region in 1963. The Commission’s recommendations contained the emphasis on the use of the principle of needs. While the federation and the Regions continued to share the federally-collected revenue, the commission recommended a change on the formula for sharing the Distributable Pool Account (DPA). Northern Region had 42 percent; Eastern Region 30 percent, Western Region 20 percent and the Mid-western Region 8 percent. The creation of the twelve state structure in 1967 brought about a revision in the revenue sharing formula, with the retention of the basic principle of allocation as recommended by the Binns Commission. In 1968, Dina Committee – an interim system pending the working out of a new revenue system following the creation of 12 states – was raised. The committee stressed the most urgent problem facing the nation as the gross imbalance in economic development among various states of the federation. Thus, it introduced minimum responsibility of government as a revenue sharing criterion. While retaining the principles of need, even-development and derivation that had been introduced by previous commissions, it recommended the establishment of a permanent revenue planning and fiscal commission. However, the recommendation of the Dina committee was never implemented. Its Report has been regarded not only as one of the best documentations on the country’s fiscal system, but also one which was too far ahead of its times (Adesina, 1998 and Omitola, 1995). Virtually all the revenue allocation formulas are warped because they have not been “open covenants openly arrived at” (Omitola, 2005). Rather, they reflect the views of commissions, individuals or groups within the commissions, which have shown proclivity for embracing theories, beliefs, ideas and approaches which have not only proved unrealistic but have thereby contributed to the dislocations within the Nigerian State by the Military.

One striking feature of the recommendations of various Revenue Allocation Commissions with respect to the revenue allocation formula adopted from the 1970s is a phenomenon tagged the “concentration process” in Nigeria’s fiscal federalism (Mbanefoh and Egwakihide 1998:22). This refers to situation whereby there is a gradual reduction of State Government Accounts and this is further exacerbated with the establishment of Special Account by the Federal Government (Mbanefoh, Egwakihide 1998). This is because it was used to favour a few selected states/Local Councils more often than not, it provoked inter-state hostility and rivalry, thereby undermining the stability and corporate existence of the country. Suberu (1995:4), observed that the subsequent periodic modifications of the various allocative criteria have achieved three things. First, they have effectively legitimized the criteria of demography and equality as the prominent principles of horizontal revenue sharing in Nigeria. Second, the periodic changes in the horizontal revenue sharing system have largely compounded the schemes intensely political and divisive nature. For instance, in 1990, the Babangida Administration re-introduced, and then assigned a weight of ten percent to the discredited principles of land mass. Ethno-regional opposition to this apparent bias to the North (which with only about half of the nation’s population), encompasses some three quarters of the national territory led some southern members of the National Constitutional Conference to propose the inclusion of the countervailing ‘political’ principle of ‘population density’ in the horizontal revenue sharing scheme. The primary effect of such regional political manoeuvres is to deprive the nation of the development of a coherent revenue sharing scheme that balances ‘efficiency’ and ‘equity’ principles of allocation in a politically healthy and economically productive manner. Third, and finally, Nigeria’s horizontal revenue sharing policies and reforms give insufficient recognition to such largely non-political principles of allocation as the social development factor and internal revenue generation
Journal of Social Science and Policy Review    Volume 4, June 2012
effort while blatantly ignoring such other technical principles as budgetary obligation, absorptive capacity, fiscal efficiency and fiscal equalizations (Ojo, 2010). The present formulae for sharing the federal revenue vertically are as follows: 




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