POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY

INTRODUCTION

Although there are many agents of political socialization, including but are not limited  to Family, Media, Peers, Education, Religion,  Race, Gender, Age and Geography, and in fact every point where man meets man, only a few major ones shall be discussed  in this unit. The unit categorizes them into two: primary and secondary. The two categories shall be fully discussed.  Knowledge of this unit shall assist the student in:  Identifying the various agents of socialization, Distinguishing between the primary and the secondary ones and Understanding how they work to socialize people into politics . The main content here discusses the major agents of political socialization. These agents refer to institutions and structures that socialize people into politics; the agents that people are introduced to as they grow up, and that affect their political views throughout the rest of their lives. In a sense we can divide the agents of political socialization into two broad categories: the primary and the secondary.  

CLARIFICATION OF TERMS

Socio-Cultural Context

Socio-cultural context refers to the idea that language, rather than existing in isolation, is closely linked to the culture and society in which it is used. This means when language is learnt, the socio-cultural context in which it is used needs to be taken into consideration as well.

Sociocultural context refers to the intersection of the social and cultural events of a certain time period that inform various phenomena such as art and political dealings. Of course, sociocultural context varies across cultures, nations, time periods and many other factors. A set of beliefs, customs, practices and behavior that exists within a population. International companies often include an examination of the

Political Behavior 

According to Eldersveld and Katz in 1961, political behaviour or behavioral approach to the study of politics “identifies the behaviour of individuals or group of individuals as the primary unit of analysis”.  It “seeks to examine the behaviour, actions and acts of individuals, rather than characteristics of institutions such as legislature, executive and judiciary”.  Traditionally, the study of politics was legalistic, normative and based on institutions, and this certainly made it challenging for the discipline to fully explain and understand the behaviour of people within their political environments. It was the need to overcome this shortcoming and achieve a better understanding of politics that gave birth to the “behavioral revolution”. This was a banner under which sociologists, survey researchers and other empiricists gathered in the 1950s to distinguish themselves from those who studied constitutions, philosophy, or history, and prominent scholars who championed the revolution are Robert Dahl (1961), and David Easton (1961).  The main aim of political behavior is to “explain behaviour with an unbiased, neutral point of view, using methods such as sampling, scaling statistical analysis and interviewing among others. The most practical way to do it is to focus on individuals and groups who are the actors in politics.  

However, subsequent scholarly definitions of political behaviour seem to have expanded beyond the issue of method and approach.  The current state of political behaviour, as some scholars now claim,  is  typically concerned with individual behaviour in the society. One of such scholars is Richard Rose who, in her 2007 work claims that political behaviour   is the study of the behaviour of political factors such as voters, lobbyists, and politicians.  From whichever angle it is defined, what you need to really grasp is that political behaviour studies the behaviour of individuals and groups towards politics and political institutions in their environment, and it attempts to use scientific methods to study them.  

Political activities

Political activities attempts to incite or organize the public to put pressure on elected representatives or public officials to retain, oppose, or change any law, policy, or decision of any level of government in any jurisdiction. 

POLITICAL ACTIVITIES AND BEHAVIOR IN NIGERIA

According to Akindele (1990) corruption in Nigeria include among others: Corruption ascendancy to political leadership through election rigging and genocidal political techniques; son of the soil philosophy; politics of expediency; doctrine of ten per centers, judicial fractionalization of human beings; political self-aggrandizement; political Hitlerism as a mechanism for retention of power; replacement of “we-feeling” by “me-feeling”, contractorcontrolled political machinery, uncurtailed lust for wealth, giving and receiving of kickbacks for government contracts, Police insistence on taking bribes as precondition for performing their duties, Bureaucrats indulgence in the act of falsifying accounts, false declaration of assets, violation of oaths of office, payment of money for government jobs not done or not well executed, penrobbery and looting of the public treasury.

Babalola (1995) argued that corruption in politics occurs at two levels. The first level has to do with the various forms of corruption in politics at the lawmaking level while the second level is at the law-implementation level. At the first level, people try to influence law-making and policy decisions while at the second level, efforts are made by people to pervert the course of justice and influence judgements.

Summarily then, the perpetration of corruption in politics is done in the following ways:

(a)     In voting there is outright buying of votes or even voters’ cards during elections. The electorates are induced or ‘settled’ with some form of gratification usually money.^[i]

(b)    Connivance with and the “settlement” of electoral officials in order to manipulate or falsify election figures. A glowing example was the 1983 elections in the second republic when the government in power manipulated election results with the connivance of electoral officials (FEDECO^[ii]).

(c)     Outright rigging of elections through other means such as thievery, threats to life, all forms of intimidation and the likes.

(d)    Use of the power of incumbency and the state machinery. There is the ‘Iron Law of African politics’ which states that no government in power ever loses election. Office holders therefore makes use of all the available weapons at their disposal to suppress opposition and win elections at all cost.

(e)     Use of money. Money is now a crucial and the most potent factor in Nigeria politics. The system does not make political aspiration available to everybody; it is available only to the rich and powerful. This is so, with the councillorship or the presidency of country, it is the same. You must be rich, powerful and well connected. No matter how popular you are, how credible or patriotic you are, your honour, reputation, integrity, records and desire to render selfless services, if you do not have money, you are a joker. Elective posts usually go to the highest bidder.

Elections and Electoral Behaviour 

This is the aspect that has so far commanded the highest level of attention from behavioral researchers, perhaps because it is often contained in the constitutions of democratic states, or it is a device instituted by the ruling class for peaceful and conservative transfer of political power, as against revolt and revolutions which are often not in their interest. Election refers to organization of voting and its allied activities such as party registration, candidates’   background checks and campaigning.  According to Nie and Verba in their 1975 work, elections are “one of those legal activities by private citizens which are more or less aimed at directly influencing the selection of government personnel and the actions they take”. Today, as another scholar has observed,  “there are more and more democratic elections all over the world in which candidates must decided not only which candidate they wish to support, but also, and perhaps more fundamentally, whether they wish to support anyone, that is, whether they wish to vote or not”. These are the words of Blais in his 2007 article titled Turnout in  Elections. 

On the other hand, the ways people behave towards election as well as the various factors that affect or determine their behaviors under different circumstances are all issues of electoral behaviour. The systematic and scientific study of elections is known as psephology. 

THE SOCIO AND CULTURAL CONTEXT OF POLITICAL ACTIVITIES AND BEHAVIOR IN NIGERIA

The institutionalization of corruption in Nigeria is not without its telling effects on the emerging political culture and behaviour. Corruption has been on for so long in Nigeria as Akindele (1990, 1995) has aptly demonstrated through a retrospective analysis of politics from independence to date. He stated that no regime can be exonerated from corruption. It has now reached unprecedented levels most especially during the Babangida regime which saw the institutionalization of the ‘statement’ syndrome. The on-going political transition has not in any way been free from corruption too as the government is busy manipulating the transition to facilitate the self-succession bid of the ruling dictator.

Corruption now appears to have become a permanent feature of the Nigerian polity. It had become completely institutionalized, entered into the realm of culture and the value-system; it is now a norm and no longer an aberration. The young ones are born into it, grew up in it, lived with it, and possibly die in it. The aged are not left out as they are resocialised and begins to conform to it. Succeeding generations now see it as part and parcel of the social order and the normative system. Cultural transmission takes place and as such behavioural traits which confirms with corruption begins to emerge

Primary Agents of Political Socialization

The primary agents of political socialization are those that people first come across when they are children and they unavoidably interact with as they grow. Almost all human beings pass through these agents, though not necessarily on their will. The primary agents of political socialization in today’s world include the family, the school, the peer group and the religious gatherings. In the contemporary world these socialization agencies can hardly be avoided, and they affect people’s believes and attitudes towards politics.  In what follows we shall discuss these agents one after the other.

(a) The Family: 

The family is a principal agent of political socialization, or any other form of socialization at all.   In fact, M. Kent Jennings in his 2007 work titled Political Socialization asserts that "from the early scholarly inquiries on through to the present time, the role of the family as a prime agent of socialization has occupied an imports in the literature". This is because the family is a relatively small and enduring institution that makes the processes of learning and imitation easier. Apart from this, the family is the first point of call of the individual, and, to that extent, it determines a lot about individual's behaviour; including the political. Above all, every human being, by no choice of theirs, is presumably born into a family, so, except in few cases, every human being passes through the socialization of the family.  

(b) The School

Formal educational system organized in forms of schools and colleges is a common phenomenon in the modern world. In fact, most advanced countries of the world are beginning to lay claim to zero percent illiteracy level in their society while third world countries are following suit.  The implication of this is that everyone in the society will now have to pass through one form of school or the other. Thus, the school, like the family, is an agent of socialization that is almost impossible to escape. Some societies deliberately teach subjects such as civil education, political history and government to educate their citizens on politics. National anthems and other extra curriculum exercises are basically performed in schools to expose students to certain values about politics. What most people know and believe about politics is therefore, especially in today’s world, a function of school attendance. The school then qualifies as a primary agency of political socialization.  

(c) The Peer Group

Man, by nature, Aristotle has long insisted, is a political animal. What you get from this is that man is a gregarious being that love to live with, and around other men. In the process of this social interaction peer groups are formed. These groups consist of people of same or close age brackets, and members of the groups learn many things socially from one another through emulation and reciprocal determinism. If a person belongs to a peer group that is politically conscious for instance, the tendency of the person to become very active and interested in the politics of his nation is very high due to the kind of socialization received in the course of interacting with his or her peers. Peer group is also a primary agent of political socialization because it is difficult to escape in the process of existing in the society. Even schools where the child is socialized is full of peer group influence, though many peer groups also  exist outside the school. 

(d) Religious Gatherings

                         Apart from the family and the school, organized religious gathering is another very strong agency of political socialization in the modern world. It is almost inescapable today. When people gather in the name of religion, they often inevitably discuss socio political issues that concern them directly or indirectly, politics being, according to David Easton, “authoritative allocation of values in the society”. Values that may be authoritatively allocated to, or omitted from people’s homes, families, streets, work places, states of residence, international relation and so on, often make people relate with politics even in religious gatherings where they are supposed to be worshiping. Today is universities, religious associations sponsor candidates into elective positions in order to gain influence. Citizens of some countries consider the religious affiliation of a political candidate as determinant of his or her capacity to rule, and such beliefs color behaviour even in elections.  The discussions and decision on these political issues are often taken in religious gatherings; hence, religion becomes a strong agent of political socialization. 

Subordinate Agents of Political Socialization

                        Structures and institutions such as the media and political parties are not common to all men; they are optional, so they belong to the secondary political socialization agents. Other ones in this category are gender and age which are though common to all men, yet,  do not command strong organizational political influence that, say, the church

and the school may have. Let us examine these four agents of political socialization in details. 

Race and Ethnicity

As a general rule, for the past half-century African Americans have been the most loyal Democrats than any other identifiable group. Some experts believe that this loyalty is weakening, but recent elections have confirmed the strong tendency for black Americans to vote Democratic. Latinos as a whole have a tendency to vote Democratic, but the relationship is not as strong as it is for blacks. To further complicate matters, the various Latino groups have very different voting patterns. For example, Cuban Americans overall have a strong tendency to vote Republican, and Mexican Americans have an equally strong tendency to vote Democratic. Some studies indicate that Asian Americans tend to vote conservative, but there is still a lack of concrete evidence to prove this.

The Media

    

                      The media is a strong agent of political socialization. The print media produces newspapers and magazines while the electronic media comes in forms of radio and television. In all of these media politics and political issues are discussed in daily basis. In fact, it has been argued by Allan Smith  that the 21^st century press media is a political media as majority of the news items are either completely political or are connected to politics.  The most recent one is the social media: the facebook and the twitters that are fast penetrating the whole world.  Issues discussed in all these media create values, attitudes and believes in people, and as such, stand as means of socializing them into politics as well as influencing their political behaviour. 

Political Party 

                       A political party is an organized body of people who participate in political activities with the sole aim of getting political power. Membership of a political party automatically translates to discussion and practice of political activities, with all the pranks, and the intrigues. People who belong to political parties learn a great deal of their political tricks, values, orientations, opinions and believes from them, so, the political party is a very strong agent of political socialization. In specific terms, political parties have orientations and ideological divides. There are left wing parties, right wing parties, mass parties and so on, and the orientation that is dominant in each of these parties are systematically handed down to their members from one generation to another. In Britain you have the conservative (right wing) and the labour (left wing) political parties. In the United States it is between the Republican (right wing) and the Democrat (left wing) parties. Although Nigerian political parties have been unstable and episodic since independence, the current ideological divide still stands between the PDP and the APC.

Gender 

            Until recently when universal adult suffrage has permeated the whole world, gender was a very key issue in political socialization. In the earlier Athenian society in Greece, women were not allowed to participate in politics, and so it was in some other parts of the world. The implication is that men would be differently socialized to form different believes opinions and orientation of politics, compared to women. Now that the dichotomy is changing rapidly, and universal adult suffrage is gaining popularity around the world; women’s socialization in politics is fast taking different dimension. Conversely, in the old

Oyo kingdom where women were known to occupy important political positions such as Iyalode, Iyaloja and Iyalaje, and where they exerted great influence in the politics of their people, there was a difference in gender relationship with politics, and this created egalitarian and democratic values among the people.  You may wish to read Eesuola’s Using Indigenous Political Structures to Facilitate Democratic Ideals in Nigeria: Lessons from Pre Colonial Yoruba Kingdom, published in the University of Lagos, Nigeria, Sociological Review, Volume 9, 2011. 

Age

           Also unlike gender, age was and is still a strong factor in the politics of courtiers. Today, as a result of universal adult suffrage, most constitutions allow citizens of eighteen years to vote and be voted for. In some countries where gerontology is common in political activities, only old people take certain electoral positions in politics. These different practices in different societies often shape opinions and orientations of people towards politics, so, age is equally an agent of political socialization. 

            Let us also quickly add that socialization may involve an individual's formative years, or his mature years, or both. Political socialization through the primary agency is not only latent,  but also tends to occur during the formative years of an individual.  Political socialization through secondary agencies, on the other hand, tends to be manifest and to occur during an individual's relatively mature years.  

Political socialization can produce either systemic or non-systemic change. Systemic change refers to a fundamental or far-reaching change in the distribution or exercise of authority in the political system. Non-systemic change, on the other hand, refers to relatively insignificant or incremental changes in the patterns of political participation and association which do not alter or upset the existing distribution of power and authority in the polity. Indeed, generally speaking, political socialization is essentially a stabilizing process and hardly produces systemic change. The political socialization process becomes destabilizing, or produces systemic change, only under conditions of rapid modernization or general societal crisis.

CONCLUSION  

These are the major issues that are critical and central to political behavior. They include political socialization, political culture and political participation, which, on its own can be regular and irregular, then, political communication as well as elections.   What we have done in the foregoing is identify the main thrusts of political behaviour: political socialization, political culture, political participation, political communication and elections.  Each of these aspects is merely mentioned and briefly discussed. They have several factors that determine them and many dimensions they take. These wider issues will be covered in the subsequent units.                           In summary, take a look at your life today, the foregoing four structures family, school, peer groups-  that is friends and colleagues- as well as your religious gathering are four structures that you constantly interact with almost on weekly basis, and in all of them, it is almost certain that politics is discussed either directly or indirectly. This makes the four of them primary agents of political socialization. In what follows however, we shall discuss four more agents of socialization that are not as central to man as the ones   considered as primary. 

REFERENCES

Alan, B. (1965) Modern' Politics and Government, London, Macmillan Press.

Almond, G. and Verba, S. (1965) The Civic Culture, Boston, Little Brown.

Ball, A.R. (1977) Modern Politics and Government, London, Macmillan.

Bender G.J. (1967) Political Socialization and Political Change, Western Political Quarterly,    390 -   407.

Bowman, L. and Boyton, G.R. (1974) Political Behaviour and Public Opinion:

Comparative Analysis. New Jersey, Prentice Hall.

Dalton, R.J and Klingemann, H.D. (2007) (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Political Behaviour. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 

De Gracia, A. (1952) Political Behaviour, New York, The Free Press.

Easton D. and Dennis J. (1969), Children and the Political System, New York, McGraw-

Hill.

Eldersveld, J. and Katz, D (1961) The Impact of Local Party Activities Upon Electorates, 

Eric, R. (1969) Modern Politics: An Introduction to Behaviour and Institutions, London, Rout-ledge and Kegan.

Greenstein F. (1965) Children and Politics, New Haven, Yale University Press.

Jennings M. Kent (2007) “Political Socialization”, in, Dalton, R. and Klingemann, H. (eds.), The Oxford handbook of political behavior, Oxford, Oxford University Press

Malbraith, L. (1972) Political Participation, Chicago, Rand McNally.

Norman, H. N.  And Sidney, V. (1975) “Political Participation” in Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby (eds.) Handbook of Political Science Vol. 4. Massachusetts, AddisonWesley.

Robert, E. D.  And John, A. H. (1972) Political Sociology, London, John Wiley and Sons. 

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[i] Settlement syndrome – a new concept now used to describe all forms of corruption in Nigeria. It is otherwise known as “Egunje”.

[ii] FEDECO – Federal Electoral Commission

DEBT AND DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION IN AFRICAN

ABSTRACT

The debt crisis, or perhaps more accurately, debt cancer that has spread across Africa in the last decade, needs little introduction. Much has already been said about the causes, consequences and costs - economic, social, human and ecological - of that affliction and about the structural adjustment and economic reform measures which have been taken to cope with it on a continental scale. The reasons which gave rise to excessive African indebtedness in the 1970s and early 1980s, and which caused it to balloon from $140 billion when the crisis emerged in 1982 to over $270 billion in 1990, have been amply documented elsewhere. It would be redundant to go into them at length again here.

INTRODUCTION

An accurate account and proper analysis of the debt crisis in developing countries of Africa, and Nigeria in particular cannot be possible without the examinations of some theories underpinning the problem. Scholars and writers have emerged with different theories and explanations concerning the debt crisis in developing poor countries. The protracted debt crisis in these countries has stimulated research projects that endeavour to unravel the causes, and explain the complexities surrounding the debt crisis. While some studies argue that dependency theory (Baran, 1957, Frank, 1971) is best for understanding the debt crisis, others maintain that development theory (Rostow, 1960) or economic explanations (Offiong, 1980) is more lucid. Yet, others contend that political explanations (Migdal, 1988) or the liberal theory (Burchill, 1996) is important. For the purpose of this paper, the dependency and liberal economic theories will be considered.

CLARIFICATION OF TERMS

A debt generally refers to money owed by one party, the debtor, to the second party, the creditor debt generally subject to contractual terms regarding the amount and timing of repaymentof the principal and the interest.

Debt service is the amount you pay on a loan in principal and interest, over a period of time. Usually debt service is calculated for a year. Banks and other lenders prefer that you list debt service separately on your Income Statement. For income tax purposes, the interest on the loan is considered a deductible business expense, while the principal is not.

Debt restructuring is a process that allows a private or public company – or a sovereign entity – facing cash flow problems and financial distress, to reduce and renegotiate its delinquent debts in order to improve or restore liquidity and rehabilitate so that it can continue its operations. Replacement of old debt by new debt when not under financial distress is referred to as refinancing.

Debt Rescheduling: A practice that involves restructuring the terms of an existing loan in order to extend the repayment period. Debt rescheduling may mean a delay in the due date of required payments or reducing payment amounts by extending the payment period and increasing the number of payments. Debt rescheduling is one way to provide a borrower with relief when needed due to an economic downturn or other unforeseen personal event (i.e. job loss, illness etc.).

A debt moratorium is a delay in the payment of debts or obligations. The term is generally used to refer to acts by national governments. A moratory law is usually passed in some special period of political or commercial stress; for instance, on several occasions during the Franco-Prussian War, the French government passed moratory laws. Proponents of debt moratoriums argue that it is a sovereign decision by the government of a nation to suspend payment of debt to its creditors, in the event that to do otherwise would do irreparable harm to the welfare of its citizenry.

Development                   

Development means different thing to different people. This may be the reason for Idode (1989) to describe development a problematic concept. According to him, development has been used in many different ways including political, economic and social. In other words, development is a construct of many applications

 In a view expressed by Okobiah (1984), development involves a process of economic, political and social change in a progress direction towards a better social well being for the member of the society. According to Nwana (1998) development involves harnessing of the resources for the realization of their major objectives, solving their major problems. This means that, development from the foregoing consists of activities required in improving the attitudes and potentials of people. Probably, this justifies the view of Boateng (1990), which describes development as the process aimed at improving the living conditions and circumstances of human beings both directly and indirectly. Considering the various views, national development encompasses social, economic, cultural and political development. In other words, the components of national development include social development, economic development, political development and cultural development.

FACTORS THAT HAVE INDUBITABLY PLAYED A MAJOR PART IN AFRICAN’S DEBT CRISES

Suffice it to say that Africa's over-indebtedness is not attributable, as many creditors would have it, merely to poor governance, rapacious and corrupt leaderships, protracted civil wars in too many countries on the continent; no democratic checks and balances on government borrowing and spending, excessive population growth, and the stubborn pursuit of economic policies which contributed to the relentless impoverishment of a rich continent for over two decades. All of these factors have indubitably played a major part. But Africa's crisis has been severely exacerbated by several other reasons as well, including:

(a)                Thoughtless and irresponsible over-lending by private and official creditors, during the commodity boom of the 1970s, without which irresponsible over-borrowing by African governments on this scale could not possibly have occurred;

(b)                The persistence of negative real interest rates during most of the 1970s in global financial markets caused by lax monetary and fiscal policies in industrial countries which made it economically rational for developing countries to borrow externally (rather than save or attract equity investment) for development and consumption;

(c)                The targeting of developing countries in general, and oil-exporting countries in particular, as major export markets to be provided with too-easy credit to facilitate the adjustment of industrial countries to the two oil-shocks (of 1973 and 1979) ;

(d)                The global monetary shock of1979-81, which aimed at ridding the world of inflation but had the collateral impact of inducing a deep and long recession, particularly in debt-ridden developing countries where the recession lasted for 70 months instead of 16 in the OECD world, and which caused commodity markets and prices to collapse;

(e)                Over-reliance on external savings between 1979-83 by African governments' unwillingness to increase domestic savings and cut domestic consumption in the erroneous belief [encouraged in some instances (e.g. Zambia) by the international financial institutions - ifls] that the commodity price collapse would be short-lived;

(f)                 A prolonged and devastating drought between 1981-84 which severely impaired the continent's agricultural and cash crop production and resulted in extensive damage to output and to the financial structure of Africa's fragile economies;

(g)                The emergence of high, positive real interest rates throughout the 1980 s which compounded Africa's debt servicing and debt accumulation burdens;

(h)                Volatile exchange rate movements throughout the 1980s with US dollar depreciation between 1985-90 resulting in increasing the dollar value of Africa's outstanding debts, over a half of which were denominated in currencies or composites which appreciated against the US dollar;

(i)                 Repeated official and private rescheduling, often on punitive terms in the early years of the debt crisis, which resulted in further increasing the outstanding level of debt while providing temporary, but totally insufficient, cash-flow relief;

(j)                 Poor and impractical advice by ifls and official creditors on the extent of debt relief African governments needed to negotiate and how they might adjust, coupled with poor management by the same governments of external debt records, policies and priorities resulting in several missed opportunities to improve· their situations;

(k)                The building up of egregious arrears which creditors have tolerated to a point of doing more damage to restoring disciplined debtor-creditor relationships than if more sensible action to reduce debt and debt service burdens had been taken by them in the first place; and last, but definitely not least,

(l) Protectionism in the world's markets for agricultural products and low technology manufactures, which makes it particularly difficult for African countries to diversify and increase exports to hard currency markets, thus making it doubly difficult for them to earn their way out of the debt trap.

Several attempts have been made to explore the impact of these and other reasons more fully on the premise that unless the causes for Africa's predicament are properly understood, appropriate solutions will be impossible to design. It would be· unproductive to revisit here what has been covered already elsewhere. There is now ample appreciation of the causes and the implications of Africa's debt burdens among its creditors, in the international community at large, and among quite a few (though unfortunately not yet all) of its governments. Indeed that has been the principal reason for creditors and donors having exerted considerable effort to deal with the problem much more seriously and responsively at least since 1987-8Success in achieving a durable solution has been elusive not because Africa's situation is inadequately appreciated or because there is lack of consensus on what the problems are and where the solutions lie. All creditors, even the reluctant and occasionally obstructive private banks, appear to agree that Africa's debt problem, and particularly that ofthe lowincome countries south ofthe Sahara, needs special attention. It is generally accepted that the sub-Saharan debt problem is different to those of middleincome developing countries in North Africa, Latin America, Eastern Europe and the Middle-East. It is comparatively small in absolute dollar terms. Sub-Saharan debt is less than a ninth of the total external debt of all developing countries. But, in relative terms it has crippled, and unless tackled will continue impairing, the ability of African economies to reverse steadily declining per capita incomes. It is not widely appreciated that annual debt service burdens remain excessively onerous although actual payments of principal and interest by low-income countries in sub-Saharan Africa in 1990 were less than 37% of scheduled debt service (after repeated rescheduling). Yet, even at that reduced level they accounted for over 80% of the region's estimated GNP in 1990 and 28% of export earnings; implying that scheduled payments would have absorbed 22% of total sub-Saharan output and nearly 70% of its export earnings in that year.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

DEPENDENCY THEORY AND LIBERAL ECONOMIC THEORY

Dependency theory and Africa’s debt crisis

Proponents of the dependency theory contend that the debt crisis in Africa could be perceived from the extreme dependence of Africa’s economies on international competitive economic conditions over which they had little control. Dependency theory is predicated on the notion that there is a ‘centre’ of wealthy states and a ‘periphery’ of poor, underdeveloped states. Resources are extracted from the periphery (developing nations) and flow towards the states at the centre (developed nations) in order to sustain their economic growth and wealth. The major contention here is that the economic development of the developing countries (the Global South) was rendered impossible by the domination of the global economy by the already industrialized capitalist powers (‘the Global North’, Offiong, 1980). The implication is that poverty; including indebtedness of the countries is the result of the manner of their integration of the world system. The historical incorporation of dependent territories into global division of labour entailed a tendency toward economic stagnation in the colonies and neo colonies (Sandbrook, 1982).

Therefore, scholars for example, agree that American based multinationals own overseas investments too large to have been generated by the capital transferred by these companies out of U.S. Their net returns of foreign exchange to the U.S. are also reported to be very high and growing. The net effect is that holes are continuously knocked into the pockets of these poor countries and the degree of their impoverishment is growing more and more until they acquire the psychological impression that the only way they can support investment is through foreign loans – loans which once acquired are swept away by worsening balance of trade (Baran, 1954; Frank,, 1971; Rodney, 1974 and Sweezy, 1978). These developing countries go for more loans hoping that this will help improve the situation, but the conditions tied to these loans always spell trouble and doom for these less developed countries (LDCs); as in the words of George Washington, the former president of U.S. ‘it is madness for one nation to expect disinterested help from another – the U.S. does not have friends, but interest’ (in Abbah, 1996). Thus dependency tightens its grip; as the LDCs go for more loans from the financial institutions and donor countries. This is the phenomenon which Cheryl (1974) called ‘debt trap’. At this point, dependency becomes inescapable.

Liberal economic theory and Africa’s debt crisis

The liberal economic theory also offers plausible contention on the debt crisis in developing countries. The major argument here is that economic liberalization will help in the increase of flow of foreign investment into the developing countries, as a result of the easing of trade and exchange restrictions. The notion is that in the process of homogenizing the political economy of every member state of the international community that the objective of creating a market society on a global scale is within reach (Biersteker, 1993). Again, one of the major objectives of liberalization is to reduce the resource gap in the LDCs, by improving the trade balance and encouraging a net capital inflow. Thus, the growing importance of international organizations such as the G7, IMF and World Bank is indicative of the influence of liberal economic internationalism in the post-Cold War period (ibid). 

However, events in the developing world provide us with some reasons why attempts made in redressing the situation through the encouragement of increased foreign borrowing have contributed to the current debt crisis by increasing the resource gap even further. These powerful transnational bodies which embody free trade liberalism as their governing ideology however impose free market strictures on developing societies. Since they are the primary organizations which formalise and institutionalise market relationships between states; they lock peripheral states into agreements which force them to lower their protective barriers (GATT and NAFTA for instance), thereby preventing developing nations from developing trade profiles which diverge from the model dictated by their supposed ‘comparative advantage’ (Burchill et al, 1996). The IMF and the World Bank for example, make the provision of finance (or more accurately ‘debt’) to developing societies conditional on their unilateral acceptance of free market rules for their economies, the conditionality of the so called - structural adjustment programme ‘SAP’ (ibid).

The IMF’s preconditions, which have their theoretical roots underpinning in monetarist doctrines, show no sensitivity or consideration to the peculiar underdeveloped nature of the economies, and as a result, the prescriptions have had the effect of threatening their very survival (Onimode, 1989). In fact one such conditional ties has been the insistence that the currencies of these countries be devalued. The application of this condition for example in Zambia 1985, Ghana and Nigeria in 1986, suggests that these economies are far from improving, rather it has worsened them, and thereby raises fundamental questions to their long term usefulness (ibid).

All these were part of the factors that rendered the African economy weak, and therefore necessitated or led to their financial plight, dependency relation and subsequent interests and demand for foreign loans.  Yet, the manipulations by the financial institutions and other lending agents, which were made feasible by the introduction of liberalism in Africa, helped in impacting negatively to the purse or coffers of African states, thus aggravated the debt crisis in the continent. For example SAP failed the majority of Nigeria; particularly it brought mass unemployment (AFRODAD, 2007). Kenya also continues to express its displeasure at the IMF and the World Bank for forcing these policy changes on it (Wayande, 1997). In the early 1980s, Uganda was rocked by weeks of demonstrations, as industrial workers and students took to the streets to denounce President Miton Obote’s IMF-imposed economic programme and in 1990, Matthew Kerokou of the Benin Republic in West Africa was removed from power following a wave of anti-SAP riots (Dare, 2001). It is therefore not surprising and understandable while notable scholars, such as Sachs (2005: 189) lambastes the IMF and World Bank for imposing draconian budgets to support SAP, which had: ‘little scientific merit

 and produced even fewer results’ It could rightly be argued that it is no coincidence that government that continued to operate quite well (e.g. Botswana) never had to subject themselves to the painful cure of SAP (Hyden, 2000). 

Therefore, this paper will apply the two theories (dependency and liberal internationalism) discussed above in the analysis of the Africa debt crisis and the IMF’s structural adjustment programme, with particular emphases on Nigeria.  

AFRICA, NIGERIA AND DEBT CRISIS

The Nigeria state, just like many other states in Africa (example, Kenya, Democratic Republic of Congo, formerly Zaire and Ghana to mention but a few) in the 1960s and early 70s were not indebted. When Nigeria obtained independence in 1960, the world believed that, she will usher in economic prosperity for her citizens. It was because of this thinking the world saw Nigeria as the future economic giant of Africa (AFRODAD, 2007). The thinking was not a mere wishful idea because: Oil, the money-spinner, had been discovered at Oloibiri in present-day Bayelsa state in 1956. By 1958, Nigeria had begun to export the black gold to earn petrol-dollars. Also, agriculture was booming; cash and food crops were being produced massively and were fetching for the nation much foreign exchange. In fact, suffice it to say that Nigeria was blessed with an abundant and a viable human resource base, a favourable climate and a vast expanse land more than twice the size of Britain (ibid).

Actually, Nigeria, comparatively with other developing countries, was rich. She had no reason to go a borrowing. In fact, Nigeria later successfully financed her 30-month civil war from 1967 to January 1970 without taking a foreign loan. It was this that made General Yakubu Gowan (1966-1975), Nigeria’s military head of state, at the time, once vaulted during the early 1970s that Nigeria problem was not cash, but rather what to use the available money to do. 

However, trend of events during some of the successive governments and administration from the periods of General Obasanjo’s regime (1976-1979) till Babangida and Abacha regimes (1985-1998), surprisingly, cause the nation’s ‘boast’ to begin to fade. She then discovered that to keep moving, she had to take foreign loans. In no time, she was subsequently caught up in a crippling foreign debt crisis that besides compromising its economic progress, political stability, social dignity and cultural integrity, also dealt a debilitating blow to the Nigerian masses, because of the pains and sufferings they passed through during SAP. 

However, a superficial reflection on the expatiated report of the IMF (and the World Bank) would show the plan as appealing option for the continent, but a critical study into the factors that led to the role of these two institutions were/are playing in the economic development of Africa would show that, after all, IMF and World Bank could be nothing but instruments of neo-colonialism. The activities of these financial institutions were more or less to maintain the dependency nature of African countries (Okafor, 2004).

This submission becomes glaring and more convincing when it is appreciated that the IMF was initially a pure European establishment. During the first period of its existence, the IMF gave the impression of certain efficiency as it helped to re-establish the convertibility of European Currencies (1948-1957); then helped European economies adjust (1958-1966). From 1967 on however, the fund failed to maintain stability despite the creation of Special Drawing Rights (SDRS). (Parity adjustments were numerous after this date: devaluation of the Pound and the Franc, revaluation of the Mark and the Yen, floating of the price of gold etc).

The adoption of the General system of floating currencies in 1973 may be considered to mark the end of the Breton Wood’s mandate. At a point, the continued existence of the IMF was called into question. The institution survived by taking new functions: Management of unilateral structural adjustment in developing countries, and, from the end of the 1980s, intervention in Eastern countries with the goal of ensuring the re-incorporation of these countries into the international monetary system (Amin, op cit: 36).                                                                

Imperatively, and drawing from the above revelations, one might be tempted to ask why an institution (IMF) which once failed to deliver in Europe was drafted to take the lead in the economic recovery of Africa and other developing world? Surprisingly, and as if oblivious of the question of incompetence on the part of the IMF, the Western governments moved to implement the recommendations of the institution by granting of loans/aids to any African state that follows the IMF’s economic liberalization policies. In Africa, this was midwifed through SAP. 

Development Forum informs us that the annual expenditure on health in the poorest countries average less than $5 per person. In wealthier countries such as USA, Canada etc. health expenditure average $400 per person (Onimode, op cit). This is because the poor are either entirely unemployed or underemployed. The situation is contrary to the decades before SAP reforms were introduced, and as the 1997 IMF Report has confirmed. According to it, in the decade prior to 1985, many countries experienced annual growth rates of employment in excess of 5 percent (including Ghana, Mali Mauritania, Niger, Tanzania and Togo) with some as high as 10 percent per annum (ibid).

Again, the loans and aid administration from the developed to underdeveloped African states remain economically retrospective. On this pedestal, it can be pointedly contended that, one of the biggest stumbling blocks to Africa’s social development in modern times was the external debt crisis. Not only did the West, through the instrumentality of IMF deplete financial resources and channel capital flows from poor countries to rich countries through interest payments, it retarded economic development and increased poverty (Filomena, 1997).

NIGERIA LEADERS, DEBT CRISIS AND IMF

It is rather unfortunate, that African leaders know this too well but still accept the loans and aids even in the face of their incapacity to pay back. This is why some less corrupt and more reliable regimes such as the government of Shagari and Buhari did not succeed in getting the IMF loan. This is because these leaders were very convinced that their administrations cannot comply with all the conditionality or prescriptions that follow SAP. Again, these leaders considered the plights and sufferings, which the Nigerian masses will pass through if they accept complying with IMF’s prescriptions. For example, the government of Shagari is noted to have assessed the IMF financial facilities after approaching the institution on loan assessment sometimes in 1983. Nigeria, under Shagari’s regime sought to borrow $2 billion from the fund, largely to help refinance, and had initiated negotiation with IMF. However its trade debt then  estimated to be between $3 billion and $5 billion has not been serviced, and Nigeria was unwilling to comply with IMF guidelines; therefore, his administration did not succeed in getting the IMF loan (Biersteker, 1993).And by the period Shagari left office in 1983, Nigeria was indebted to $14,130.7 million (CBN Annual Report, 1988).

Also, under Buhari government; in spite of the fact that the Buhari administration serviced her foreign debts more than other regimes, the IMF, acting through the US blocked the loan application of $1.6 billion which the government of made to Saudi Arabia in February 1984. This yet compelled Buhari’s government to start negotiations with IMF in late February 1984.  But after series of discussions, the government publicly criticized the IMF around mid-1985 suggesting a deadlock over possibility of assessing IMF loan (Banguna, 1987). And by the period Buhari left office, Nigeria owed $18,034.1milllion (CBN, op cit).

However, unlike the above two regimes, Babangida, quickly accepted complying with the IMF prescriptions without considering the interest of the Nigerian masses. The simple logic is that the IMF wants to assert its hegemony over Nigeria at all cost, while Nigeria under Babangida’s regime in the same ball game, wants to assert its supremacy over the Nigerian citizens, without considering their conditions.  This is what made the various groups in Nigeria to vehemently oppose the SAP and Babangida’s regime diametrically, with the resultant riots, demonstrations and conflicts in the midst of suffering because of the excruciating effects of SAP.  Having forced Nigerians to accept the IMF, in a bid to keep the tentacles of Nigeria’s dependency on Westerners and their international financial institutions going; the debt crisis plummets, since Babangida’s regime was unable to service her debts which as at 1989 have risen to $29.28 million and by 1993 when he left office, the country was indebted to over $32 million (CBN, ibid). In fact, it has been argued that the IFIs (particularly, the IMF and World Bank) and the West should be blamed for causing the Nigeria’s debt crisis. This is because, 

At the close of the day a situation was created in the process of the international trade between Nigeria and the West was exploited by the IFIs and the West to create foreign debts and a debt crisis later in Nigeria. Also, the process was used to create stolen wealth for Nigerians, the IFIs and the West at the detriment of Nigeria (AFRODAD, op cit: 9). 

CONCLUSION

In summary, therefore, Nigerian leaders, IFIs and the West have individually or jointly involved in the plot to the looting of a huge volume of Nigeria’s external loans as well as domestic resources. This has made the nation’s debt crisis critical, coupled with the failed polices of IMF through its SAP economic reforms. Really, when a cost comparative analysis is taken of the social/environmental damage, political unrest, conflicts, insecurity and sufferings inflicted on Nigerians by the policies of the IFIs, particularly IMF’s SAP and sovereign governments of the West, the irresistible conclusion is that Nigeria has already repaid all her debts in calculable terms. In fact what Nigeria needs is not debt repayment but payment of reparations to her years of colonial and neo-colonial exploitation by the West and the industrialized creditor nations. This exploitation was made possible through the dependency relationship and the introduction of liberal economic ideology in Africa and Nigeria in particular.

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