ABSTRACT
The
debt crisis, or perhaps more accurately, debt cancer that has spread across
Africa in the last decade, needs little introduction. Much has already been
said about the causes, consequences and costs - economic, social, human and
ecological - of that affliction and about the structural adjustment and
economic reform measures which have been taken to cope with it on a continental
scale. The reasons which gave rise to excessive African indebtedness in the
1970s and early 1980s, and which caused it to balloon from $140 billion when
the crisis emerged in 1982 to over $270 billion in 1990, have been amply
documented elsewhere. It would be redundant to go into them at
length again here.
INTRODUCTION
An accurate account and
proper analysis of the debt crisis in developing countries of Africa, and
Nigeria in particular cannot be possible without the examinations of some
theories underpinning the problem. Scholars and writers have emerged with
different theories and explanations concerning the debt crisis in developing
poor countries. The protracted debt crisis in these countries has stimulated
research projects that endeavour to unravel the causes, and explain the
complexities surrounding the debt crisis. While some studies argue that
dependency theory (Baran, 1957, Frank, 1971) is best for understanding the debt
crisis, others maintain that development theory (Rostow, 1960) or economic
explanations (Offiong, 1980) is more lucid. Yet, others contend that political
explanations (Migdal, 1988) or the liberal theory (Burchill, 1996) is
important. For the purpose of this paper, the dependency and liberal economic
theories will be considered.
CLARIFICATION OF TERMS
A
debt generally refers to money owed
by one party, the debtor, to the second party, the creditor debt generally
subject to contractual terms regarding the amount and timing of repaymentof the
principal and the interest.
Debt
service is the amount you pay on a loan in principal and
interest, over a period of time. Usually debt service is calculated for a year.
Banks and other lenders prefer that you list debt service separately on your
Income Statement. For income tax purposes, the interest on the loan is considered a
deductible business expense, while the principal is not.
Debt restructuring is a
process that allows a private or public company – or a sovereign entity –
facing cash flow problems and financial distress, to reduce and renegotiate
its delinquent debts in order to improve or restore liquidity and rehabilitate
so that it can continue its operations. Replacement of old debt by new debt
when not under financial distress is referred to as refinancing.
Debt Rescheduling: A practice that involves restructuring
the terms of an existing loan in order to extend the repayment period. Debt
rescheduling may mean a delay in the due date of required payments or reducing
payment amounts by extending the payment period and increasing the number of
payments. Debt rescheduling is one way to provide a borrower with relief when
needed due to an economic downturn or other unforeseen personal event (i.e. job
loss, illness etc.).
A debt moratorium
is a delay in the payment of debts or obligations.
The term is generally used to refer to acts by national governments. A moratory
law is usually passed in some special period of political or commercial
stress; for instance, on several occasions during the Franco-Prussian
War, the French
government passed moratory laws. Proponents of debt moratoriums argue that it
is a sovereign decision by the government of a nation to suspend payment of debt to its
creditors, in the event that to do otherwise would do irreparable harm to the
welfare of its citizenry.
Development
Development means
different thing to different people. This may be the reason for Idode (1989) to
describe development a problematic concept. According to him, development has
been used in many different ways including political, economic and social. In
other words, development is a construct of many applications
In a view expressed by Okobiah (1984),
development involves a process of economic, political and social change in a
progress direction towards a better social well being for the member of the
society. According to Nwana (1998) development involves harnessing of the
resources for the realization of their major objectives, solving their major
problems. This means that, development from the foregoing consists of
activities required in improving the attitudes and potentials of people.
Probably, this justifies the view of Boateng (1990), which describes
development as the process aimed at improving the living conditions and
circumstances of human beings both directly and indirectly. Considering the
various views, national development encompasses social, economic, cultural and
political development. In other words, the components of national development
include social development, economic development, political development and
cultural development.
FACTORS
THAT HAVE INDUBITABLY PLAYED A MAJOR PART IN AFRICAN’S DEBT CRISES
Suffice it to say that
Africa's over-indebtedness is not attributable, as many creditors would have
it, merely to poor governance, rapacious and corrupt leaderships, protracted
civil wars in too many countries on the continent; no democratic checks and
balances on government borrowing and spending, excessive population growth, and
the stubborn pursuit of economic policies which contributed to the relentless
impoverishment of a rich continent for over two decades. All of these factors
have indubitably played a major part. But Africa's crisis has been severely
exacerbated by several other reasons as well, including:
(a)
Thoughtless and irresponsible over-lending by
private and official creditors, during the commodity boom of the 1970s, without
which irresponsible over-borrowing by African governments on this scale could
not possibly have occurred;
(b)
The persistence of negative real interest
rates during most of the 1970s in global financial markets caused by lax
monetary and fiscal policies in industrial countries which made it economically
rational for developing countries to borrow externally (rather than save or
attract equity investment) for development and consumption;
(c)
The targeting of developing countries in
general, and oil-exporting countries in particular, as major export markets to
be provided with too-easy credit to facilitate the adjustment of industrial
countries to the two oil-shocks (of 1973 and 1979) ;
(d)
The global monetary shock of1979-81, which
aimed at ridding the world of inflation but had the collateral impact of
inducing a deep and long recession, particularly in debt-ridden developing
countries where the recession lasted for 70 months instead of 16 in the OECD
world, and which caused commodity markets and prices to collapse;
(e)
Over-reliance on external savings between
1979-83 by African governments' unwillingness to increase domestic savings and
cut domestic consumption in the erroneous belief [encouraged in some instances
(e.g. Zambia) by the international financial institutions - ifls] that the
commodity price collapse would be short-lived;
(f)
A prolonged and devastating drought between
1981-84 which severely impaired the continent's agricultural and cash crop
production and resulted in extensive damage to output and to the financial
structure of Africa's fragile economies;
(g)
The emergence of high, positive real interest
rates throughout the 1980 s which compounded Africa's debt servicing and debt
accumulation burdens;
(h)
Volatile exchange rate movements throughout
the 1980s with US dollar depreciation between 1985-90 resulting in increasing
the dollar value of Africa's outstanding debts, over a half of which were
denominated in currencies or composites which appreciated against the US
dollar;
(i)
Repeated official and private rescheduling,
often on punitive terms in the early years of the debt crisis, which resulted
in further increasing the outstanding level of debt while providing temporary,
but totally insufficient, cash-flow relief;
(j)
Poor and impractical advice by ifls and
official creditors on the extent of debt relief African governments needed to
negotiate and how they might adjust, coupled with poor management by the same
governments of external debt records, policies and priorities resulting in
several missed opportunities to improve· their situations;
(k)
The building up of egregious arrears which
creditors have tolerated to a point of doing more damage to restoring
disciplined debtor-creditor relationships than if more sensible action to
reduce debt and debt service burdens had been taken by them in the first place;
and last, but definitely not least,
(l) Protectionism in the
world's markets for agricultural products and low technology manufactures,
which makes it particularly difficult for African countries to diversify and
increase exports to hard currency markets, thus making it doubly difficult for
them to earn their way out of the debt trap.
Several attempts have been
made to explore the impact of these and other reasons more fully on the premise
that unless the causes for Africa's predicament are properly understood,
appropriate solutions will be impossible to design. It would be· unproductive
to revisit here what has been covered already elsewhere. There is now ample
appreciation of the causes and the implications of Africa's debt burdens among
its creditors, in the international community at large, and among quite a few
(though unfortunately not yet all) of its governments. Indeed that has been the
principal reason for creditors and donors having exerted considerable effort to
deal with the problem much more seriously and responsively at least since
1987-8Success in achieving a durable solution has been elusive not because
Africa's situation is inadequately appreciated or because there is lack of
consensus on what the problems are and where the solutions lie. All creditors,
even the reluctant and occasionally obstructive private banks, appear to agree
that Africa's debt problem, and
particularly that ofthe lowincome countries south ofthe Sahara, needs
special attention. It is generally accepted that the sub-Saharan debt problem
is different to those of middleincome developing countries in North Africa,
Latin America, Eastern Europe and the Middle-East. It is comparatively small in absolute dollar terms. Sub-Saharan
debt is less than a ninth of the
total external debt of all developing countries. But, in relative terms it has crippled, and unless tackled will continue
impairing, the ability of African economies to reverse steadily declining per
capita incomes. It is not widely appreciated that annual debt service burdens
remain excessively onerous although actual
payments of principal and interest by low-income countries in sub-Saharan
Africa in 1990 were less than 37% of scheduled
debt service (after repeated rescheduling). Yet, even at that reduced level
they accounted for over 80% of
the region's estimated GNP in 1990 and 28% of export earnings; implying that
scheduled payments would have absorbed 22%
of total sub-Saharan output and nearly 70% of its export earnings in
that year.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
DEPENDENCY THEORY AND LIBERAL ECONOMIC THEORY
Dependency theory and Africa’s debt crisis
Proponents of the dependency
theory contend that the debt crisis in Africa could be perceived from the
extreme dependence of Africa’s economies on international competitive economic
conditions over which they had little control. Dependency theory is predicated
on the notion that there is a ‘centre’ of wealthy states and a ‘periphery’ of
poor, underdeveloped states. Resources are extracted from the periphery
(developing nations) and flow towards the states at the centre (developed
nations) in order to sustain their economic growth and wealth. The major
contention here is that the economic development of the developing countries
(the Global South) was rendered impossible by the domination of the global
economy by the already industrialized capitalist powers (‘the Global North’,
Offiong, 1980). The implication is that poverty; including indebtedness of the
countries is the result of the manner of their integration of the world system.
The historical incorporation of dependent territories into global division of labour
entailed a tendency toward economic stagnation in the colonies and neo colonies
(Sandbrook, 1982).
Therefore, scholars for
example, agree that American based multinationals own overseas investments too
large to have been generated by the capital transferred by these companies out
of U.S. Their net returns of foreign exchange to the U.S. are also reported to
be very high and growing. The net effect is that holes are continuously knocked
into the pockets of these poor countries and the degree of their impoverishment
is growing more and more until they acquire the psychological impression that
the only way they can support investment is through foreign loans – loans which
once acquired are swept away by worsening balance of trade (Baran, 1954;
Frank,, 1971; Rodney, 1974 and Sweezy, 1978). These developing countries go for
more loans hoping that this will help improve the situation, but the conditions
tied to these loans always spell trouble and doom for these less developed
countries (LDCs); as in the words of George Washington, the former president of
U.S. ‘it is madness for one nation to expect disinterested help from another –
the U.S. does not have friends, but interest’ (in Abbah, 1996). Thus dependency
tightens its grip; as the LDCs go for more loans from the financial
institutions and donor countries. This is the phenomenon which Cheryl (1974)
called ‘debt trap’. At this point, dependency becomes inescapable.
Liberal economic theory and Africa’s debt crisis
The liberal economic theory
also offers plausible contention on the debt crisis in developing countries.
The major argument here is that economic liberalization will help in the
increase of flow of foreign investment into the developing countries, as a
result of the easing of trade and exchange restrictions. The notion is that in
the process of homogenizing the political economy of every member state of the
international community that the objective of creating a market society on a
global scale is within reach (Biersteker, 1993). Again, one of the major
objectives of liberalization is to reduce the resource gap in the LDCs, by
improving the trade balance and encouraging a net capital inflow. Thus, the
growing importance of international organizations such as the G7, IMF and World
Bank is indicative of the influence of liberal economic internationalism in the
post-Cold War period (ibid).
However, events in the
developing world provide us with some reasons why attempts made in redressing
the situation through the encouragement of increased foreign borrowing have
contributed to the current debt crisis by increasing the resource gap even
further. These powerful transnational bodies which embody free trade liberalism
as their governing ideology however impose free market strictures on developing
societies. Since they are the primary organizations which formalise and
institutionalise market relationships between states; they lock peripheral
states into agreements which force them to lower their protective barriers
(GATT and NAFTA for instance), thereby preventing developing nations from
developing trade profiles which diverge from the model dictated by their
supposed ‘comparative advantage’ (Burchill et al, 1996). The IMF and the World
Bank for example, make the provision of finance (or more accurately ‘debt’) to
developing societies conditional on their unilateral acceptance of free market
rules for their economies, the conditionality of the so called - structural
adjustment programme ‘SAP’ (ibid).
The IMF’s preconditions,
which have their theoretical roots underpinning in monetarist doctrines, show
no sensitivity or consideration to the peculiar underdeveloped nature of the
economies, and as a result, the prescriptions have had the effect of
threatening their very survival (Onimode, 1989). In fact one such conditional
ties has been the insistence that the currencies of these countries be
devalued. The application of this condition for example in Zambia 1985, Ghana
and Nigeria in 1986, suggests that these economies are far from improving,
rather it has worsened them, and thereby raises fundamental questions to their
long term usefulness (ibid).
All these were part of the
factors that rendered the African economy weak, and therefore necessitated or
led to their financial plight, dependency relation and subsequent interests and
demand for foreign loans. Yet, the
manipulations by the financial institutions and other lending agents, which
were made feasible by the introduction of liberalism in Africa, helped in
impacting negatively to the purse or coffers of African states, thus aggravated
the debt crisis in the continent. For example SAP failed the majority of
Nigeria; particularly it brought mass unemployment (AFRODAD, 2007). Kenya also
continues to express its displeasure at the IMF and the World Bank for forcing
these policy changes on it (Wayande, 1997). In the early 1980s, Uganda was
rocked by weeks of demonstrations, as industrial workers and students took to
the streets to denounce President Miton Obote’s IMF-imposed economic programme
and in 1990, Matthew Kerokou of the Benin Republic in West Africa was removed
from power following a wave of anti-SAP riots (Dare, 2001). It is therefore not
surprising and understandable while notable scholars, such as Sachs (2005: 189)
lambastes the IMF and World Bank for imposing draconian budgets to support SAP,
which had: ‘little scientific merit
and produced even fewer results’ It could
rightly be argued that it is no coincidence that government that continued to
operate quite well (e.g. Botswana) never had to subject themselves to the
painful cure of SAP (Hyden, 2000).
Therefore, this paper will
apply the two theories (dependency and liberal internationalism) discussed
above in the analysis of the Africa debt crisis and the IMF’s structural
adjustment programme, with particular emphases on Nigeria.
AFRICA, NIGERIA AND DEBT CRISIS
The Nigeria state, just like
many other states in Africa (example, Kenya, Democratic Republic of Congo,
formerly Zaire and Ghana to mention but a few) in the 1960s and early 70s were not
indebted. When Nigeria obtained independence in 1960, the world believed that,
she will usher in economic prosperity for her citizens. It was because of this
thinking the world saw Nigeria as the future economic giant of Africa (AFRODAD,
2007). The thinking was not a mere wishful idea because: Oil, the
money-spinner, had been discovered at Oloibiri in present-day Bayelsa state in
1956. By 1958, Nigeria had begun to export the black gold to earn
petrol-dollars. Also, agriculture was booming; cash and food crops were being
produced massively and were fetching for the nation much foreign exchange. In
fact, suffice it to say that Nigeria was blessed with an abundant and a viable
human resource base, a favourable climate and a vast expanse land more than twice
the size of Britain (ibid).
Actually, Nigeria,
comparatively with other developing countries, was rich. She had no reason to
go a borrowing. In fact, Nigeria later successfully financed her 30-month civil
war from 1967 to January 1970 without taking a foreign loan. It was this that
made General Yakubu Gowan (1966-1975), Nigeria’s military head of state, at the
time, once vaulted during the early 1970s that Nigeria problem was not cash,
but rather what to use the available money to do.
However, trend of events
during some of the successive governments and administration from the periods
of General Obasanjo’s regime (1976-1979) till Babangida and Abacha regimes
(1985-1998), surprisingly, cause the nation’s ‘boast’ to begin to fade. She then
discovered that to keep moving, she had to take foreign loans. In no time, she
was subsequently caught up in a crippling foreign debt crisis that besides
compromising its economic progress, political stability, social dignity and
cultural integrity, also dealt a debilitating blow to the Nigerian masses,
because of the pains and sufferings they passed through during SAP.
However, a superficial
reflection on the expatiated report of the IMF (and the World Bank) would show
the plan as appealing option for the continent, but a critical study into the
factors that led to the role of these two institutions were/are playing in the
economic development of Africa would show that, after all, IMF and World Bank
could be nothing but instruments of neo-colonialism. The activities of these
financial institutions were more or less to maintain the dependency nature of
African countries (Okafor, 2004).
This submission becomes
glaring and more convincing when it is appreciated that the IMF was initially a
pure European establishment. During the first period of its existence, the IMF
gave the impression of certain efficiency as it helped to re-establish the
convertibility of European Currencies (1948-1957); then helped European
economies adjust (1958-1966). From 1967 on however, the fund failed to maintain
stability despite the creation of Special Drawing Rights (SDRS). (Parity
adjustments were numerous after this date: devaluation of the Pound and the
Franc, revaluation of the Mark and the Yen, floating of the price of gold etc).
The
adoption of the General system of floating currencies in 1973 may be considered
to mark the end of the Breton Wood’s mandate. At a point, the continued
existence of the IMF was called into question. The institution survived by
taking new functions: Management of unilateral structural adjustment in
developing countries, and, from the end of the 1980s, intervention in Eastern
countries with the goal of ensuring the re-incorporation of these countries
into the international monetary system (Amin, op cit: 36).
Imperatively, and drawing
from the above revelations, one might be tempted to ask why an institution
(IMF) which once failed to deliver in Europe was drafted to take the lead in
the economic recovery of Africa and other developing world? Surprisingly, and
as if oblivious of the question of incompetence on the part of the IMF, the
Western governments moved to implement the recommendations of the institution
by granting of loans/aids to any African state that follows the IMF’s economic
liberalization policies. In Africa, this was midwifed through SAP.
Development Forum informs us
that the annual expenditure on health in the poorest countries average less
than $5 per person. In wealthier countries such as USA, Canada etc. health
expenditure average $400 per person (Onimode, op cit). This is because the poor
are either entirely unemployed or underemployed. The situation is contrary to
the decades before SAP reforms were introduced, and as the 1997 IMF Report has
confirmed. According to it, in the decade prior to 1985, many countries
experienced annual growth rates of employment in excess of 5 percent (including
Ghana, Mali Mauritania, Niger, Tanzania and Togo) with some as high as 10 percent
per annum (ibid).
Again, the loans and aid
administration from the developed to underdeveloped African states remain
economically retrospective. On this pedestal, it can be pointedly contended
that, one of the biggest stumbling blocks to Africa’s social development in
modern times was the external debt crisis. Not only did the West, through the
instrumentality of IMF deplete financial resources and channel capital flows
from poor countries to rich countries through interest payments, it retarded economic
development and increased poverty (Filomena, 1997).
NIGERIA LEADERS, DEBT CRISIS AND IMF
It is rather unfortunate,
that African leaders know this too well but still accept the loans and aids
even in the face of their incapacity to pay back. This is why some less corrupt
and more reliable regimes such as the government of Shagari and Buhari did not
succeed in getting the IMF loan. This is because these leaders were very
convinced that their administrations cannot comply with all the conditionality
or prescriptions that follow SAP. Again, these leaders considered the plights
and sufferings, which the Nigerian masses will pass through if they accept
complying with IMF’s prescriptions. For example, the government of Shagari is
noted to have assessed the IMF financial facilities after approaching the
institution on loan assessment sometimes in 1983. Nigeria, under Shagari’s
regime sought to borrow $2 billion from the fund, largely to help refinance,
and had initiated negotiation with IMF. However its trade debt then estimated to be between $3 billion and $5
billion has not been serviced, and Nigeria was unwilling to comply with IMF
guidelines; therefore, his administration did not succeed in getting the IMF
loan (Biersteker, 1993).And by the period Shagari left office in 1983, Nigeria
was indebted to $14,130.7 million (CBN Annual Report, 1988).
Also, under Buhari
government; in spite of the fact that the Buhari administration serviced her
foreign debts more than other regimes, the IMF, acting through the US blocked
the loan application of $1.6 billion which the government of made to Saudi
Arabia in February 1984. This yet compelled Buhari’s government to start
negotiations with IMF in late February 1984.
But after series of discussions, the government publicly criticized the
IMF around mid-1985 suggesting a deadlock over possibility of assessing IMF
loan (Banguna, 1987). And by the period Buhari left office, Nigeria owed
$18,034.1milllion (CBN, op cit).
However, unlike the above
two regimes, Babangida, quickly accepted complying with the IMF prescriptions
without considering the interest of the Nigerian masses. The simple logic is
that the IMF wants to assert its hegemony over Nigeria at all cost, while
Nigeria under Babangida’s regime in the same ball game, wants to assert its
supremacy over the Nigerian citizens, without considering their
conditions. This is what made the
various groups in Nigeria to vehemently oppose the SAP and Babangida’s regime
diametrically, with the resultant riots, demonstrations and conflicts in the
midst of suffering because of the excruciating effects of SAP. Having forced Nigerians to accept the IMF, in
a bid to keep the tentacles of Nigeria’s dependency on Westerners and their
international financial institutions going; the debt crisis plummets, since
Babangida’s regime was unable to service her debts which as at 1989 have risen
to $29.28 million and by 1993 when he left office, the country was indebted to
over $32 million (CBN, ibid). In fact, it has been argued that the IFIs
(particularly, the IMF and World Bank) and the West should be blamed for
causing the Nigeria’s debt crisis. This is because,
At the close of the day a
situation was created in the process of the international trade between Nigeria
and the West was exploited by the IFIs and the West to create foreign debts and
a debt crisis later in Nigeria. Also, the process was used to create stolen
wealth for Nigerians, the IFIs and the West at the detriment of Nigeria
(AFRODAD, op cit: 9).
CONCLUSION
In summary, therefore,
Nigerian leaders, IFIs and the West have individually or jointly involved in
the plot to the looting of a huge volume of Nigeria’s external loans as well as
domestic resources. This has made the nation’s debt crisis critical, coupled
with the failed polices of IMF through its SAP economic reforms. Really, when a
cost comparative analysis is taken of the social/environmental damage,
political unrest, conflicts, insecurity and sufferings inflicted on Nigerians
by the policies of the IFIs, particularly IMF’s SAP and sovereign governments
of the West, the irresistible conclusion is that Nigeria has already repaid all
her debts in calculable terms. In fact what Nigeria needs is not debt repayment
but payment of reparations to her years of colonial and neo-colonial
exploitation by the West and the industrialized creditor nations. This
exploitation was made possible through the dependency relationship and the
introduction of liberal economic ideology in Africa and Nigeria in particular.
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