Wednesday 3 December 2014

PlatoÕs Critique of the Democratic Character by DOMINIC SCOTT



PlatoÕs Critique of the Democratic Character by
DOMINIC SCOTT
ABSTRACT
This paper tackles some issues arising from PlatoÕs account of the democratic man in Rep. VIII. One problem is that Plato tends to analyse him in terms of the desires that he fulŽ ls, yet sends out con icting signals about exactly what kind of desires are at issue. Scholars are divided over whether all of the democratÕs desires are appetites. There is, however, strong evidence against seeing him as exclusively appetitive: rather he is someone who satisŽ es desires from all three parts of his soul, although his rational and spirited desires differ signiŽ cantly from those of the philosopher or the timocrat.
A second problem concerns the question why the democrat ranks so low in PlatoÕs estimation, especially why he is placed beneath the oligarch. My explanation is that Plato presents him as a jumble of desires, someone in whom order and unity have all but disintegrated. In this way he represents a step beyond the merely bipolarised oligarch.
The Ž nal section of the paper focuses on the democratÕs rational part, and asks whether it plays any role in shaping his life as a whole. For the disunity criticism to hold, Plato ought to allow very little global reasoning: if there were a single deliberating reason imposing a life plan upon his life, the fragmentation of life and character discussed earlier would only be superŽ cial. I argue that Plato attributes very little global reasoning to the democrat. Aside from the fact that the text fails to mention such reasoning taking place, PlatoÕs views on the development of character and his use of the state-soul analogy show that the democratÕs lifestyle is determined just by the strength of the desires that he happens to feel at any one time.
Although often viewed as a critique of political democracy, PlatoÕs Republic also discusses in some detail a character whose soul is the microcosm of the democratic state (558c-562a). This passage is less well known than some of those concerned with political democracy, yet it raises important and difŽ cult issues in PlatoÕs moral psychology. For one thing, it is unclear exactly how we are meant to understand the nature of the democratic character. Much of the passage analyses him in terms of the desires that he fulŽ ls; yet it sends out con icting signals about exactly what kinds of desires are at issue. A second problem concerns the question of why the democrat ranks so low in PlatoÕs estimation. The passage in question comes as part of a longer argument in which four different character types are compared – the timocrat, the oligarch, the democrat and the tyrant. PlatoÕs main charge against the democrat seems to be that
© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2000 Phronesis XLV,1
he is something of a dilettante,  itting from one desire to another. Yet he ranks only just above the tyrant and below the oligarch, who is himself hardly a very attractive character – obsessed by money, deeply con icted and prone to abuse orphans.1 In this paper, I wish to show how these problems, which are closely interconnected, can be resolved.

1.    Background

First, we need to sketch in the background to the account of the degenerate characters. At the end of Republic 4, Socrates and Glaucon seem conŽ dent that the just person is better off than the unjust (445a5-b5). Nevertheless, Socrates proposes to clarify their conclusion by analysing injustice and vice more closely. At this point he is about to embark on an account of the principal types of vice, making heavy use of the state-soul analogy in which there is a type of corrupt state to correspond to each type of vice in the soul. Instead he is interrupted and challenged to elaborate upon the arrangements for the rulers of the ideal state; this in turn leads him on to their education and the epistemology and metaphysics of books 5-7. It is only at the beginning of book 8 that he returns to the project mentioned at the end of book 4 and embarks on a description of the four principal types of vice: timocracy, oligarchy, democracy and tyranny.
Rather than simply classifying the different types of vice in state and soul, Socrates presents them as a series in a narrative of moral degeneration, starting with timocracy and culminating with tyranny. In summary, decline of the soul is as follows. First in line after the just soul is the timocrat, devoted to the pursuit of honour. His son degenerates into the oligarch, who seems to value money above everything and puts all his efforts into acquiring it. He in turn has a son who becomes the democratic character, feeling all kinds of desires and giving them freedom and equality.
Accepted September 1999
1 The judgement on the four different characters is made explicit at 580a9-c8. It is left to Glaucon to afŽ rm the democratÕs ranking (580b5-7), and so one might try to dissolve the second problem by claiming that Socrates himself does not agree with this verdict. (This approach was suggested to me by Rosslyn Weiss.) But I can think of no explanation as to why Socrates would leave a major blunder on GlauconÕs part uncorrected. In the absence of such an explanation, I shall assume that Socrates endorses the GlauconÕs response. Furthermore, Socrates has already committed himself to the same ranking of the political constitutions at 568c9-d1 by placing them in an ascending scale, with democracy only just above tyranny at the lower end. If Socrates did not also endorse the same ranking of the individual, it would be very strange for him not even to allude to the fact.
In the Ž nal stage of the decline, the son of the democrat turns into the tyrant, who is dominated by the very worst kind of desire (described as some sort of eros or lust) and who shows total ruthlessness in the lengths he will go to satisfy it.
To understand this pattern of degeneration we should start with the role that the theory of the tripartite soul plays throughout books 8-9. The just soul is dominated by reason and, as one goes down the series of deviant characters, the non-rational parts assert themselves in various ways. This is obvious in the case of the timocratic man, who is ruled by spirit – better than appetite, but inferior to reason. Plato then analyses the remaining three characters by making various divisions within the appetitive part. The oligarch is introduced by the distinction between necessary and unnecessary appetites (554a5-8), and described as someone who restrains his unnecessary appetites, spending his money only to satisfy the necessary ones.[1] The same distinction is invoked with the introduction of the democrat, although this time it is more carefully explained: necessary appetites are for things that lead to or preserve health or, more generally, are practically useful, the unnecessary for things that are super uous, and sometimes actively harmful (558d4-559d2). The oligarchÕs son transforms into the democrat when he puts all appetites on an equal footing. Finally, when introducing the tyrant, Plato makes a further distinction, this time between those unnecessary appetites which are ÔlawfulÕ and those which are ÔlawlessÕ, and portrays the tyrant as someone who gives his lawless appetites full rein.[2]
The fact that each of the last three stages in the decline is introduced with a discussion of different types of appetite suggests that the appetitive part provides the key to understanding all three characters and their respective ordering. In particular, it is tempting to assume that each one is dominated by some kind of appetitive desire. In the case of the oligarch and the tyrant, this assumption is correct: they subjugate everything to necessary and lawless appetites respectively. If we are to Ž t the democrat into this pattern, we might claim that he too is essentially appetitive, wedged in between the oligarch and the tyrant: better than one because he restrains his lawless desires, worse than the other because he gives the rest of his unnecessary appetites full rein. This view appears to be supported by two back-references in book 9, where the democrat is presented as a mid-point between the other two characters (572b10-d3 and 587c7). On closer inspection, however, PlatoÕs democrat proves reluctant to Ž t so easily into this mould.

2.    The range of democratic desires

Much of the description of the democrat focuses upon the way he transforms from his oligarchic starting-point. There are actually two stages in his journey to full democracy. As a youth, he restrains his unnecessary desires just like his father and, in the Ž rst stage (558c8-561a8), we hear of the way in which he is tempted to give up this restraint. After holding back initially, he gives in and casts his oligarchic upbringing aside, treating necessary and unnecessary desires on a par. The ÔjuniorÕ democrat, as I shall call him, lives the life of a voluptuary, despising the thrift and caution of his upbringing.
As he grows older and once Ôthe great tumult within has spent itselfÕ, some of the elements previously expelled are let back in (561a8-b2). From now on, he puts all his desires on a footing of equality:
And so he lives, always surrendering rule over himself to whichever desire comes along, as if it were chosen by lot. And when that is satisŽ ed, he surrenders the rule to another, not disdaining any, but satisfying them all equally.[3]
In this account, the political analogy is very much to the fore. Desires correspond to citizens in the state and, just as each citizen is given an equal share of power (558c5-6), each desire in the individualÕs soul is allowed its moment of satisfaction. The result is that he has a truly diverse lifestyle, sometimes partying, then economising, fasting and exercising; he also has aspirations to the military life, politics and even (what he imagines to be) philosophy.
The issue I wish to focus upon is the assumption that the ÔseniorÕ democrat is essentially appetitive. Here is the description of his life-style once he reached full egalitarianism:
Sometimes he drinks heavily while listening to the  ute; at other times he drinks only water and is on a diet; sometimes he goes in for physical training; at other times, heÕs idle and neglects everything; and sometimes he even occupies himself with what he takes to be philosophy. He often engages in politics, leaping up from his seat and saying and doing whatever comes into his mind. If he happens to admire soldiers, heÕs carried in that direction, if money makers, in that one. (561c7-d5)
This makes him sound like someone who dabbles in all sorts of things that others pursue more single-mindedly. But are all the desires satisŽ ed in this life-style appetites? The references to military and political aspirations suggest that he supplements his enjoyment of the appetitive pleasures with the satisfaction of spirited desires: on some days, he champions a cause and the pursuit of victory becomes his goal. Again, his pursuit of some sort of intellectual interest (though not, in PlatoÕs sense, philosophy) suggests that he is someone for whom discovery can occasionally be a goal and that he satisŽ es rational desires.[4] The impression that he is more than merely appetitive is reinforced a few lines later, when he is presented as some kind of psychological salad, composed of elements of the other characters:
I suppose that heÕs a complex man, full of all sorts of characters, Ž ne and multicolored, just like the democratic city, and that many men and women might envy his life since it contains the most models of constitutions and ways of living. (561e3-7)
The problem is that, although there are no explicit statements that the senior democrat is essentially appetitive, the broader context of books 8-9 suggests that the democratic character is located in the middle of an appetitive triad; when we actually encounter him, he appears to wander freely among all the different categories of desire.[5]
One way to tackle the problem would be to insist that, appearances aside, all the democratÕs desires come from the appetitive part. This would result in making his desires for warfare, politics and ÔphilosophyÕ radically different from those that motivate the just person or the timocrat.[6]But if I am right that the democrat is occasionally attracted by the prospect of achieving victory in a cause or of satisfying his curiosity, there is a problem with this approach. When differentiating the three parts of the soul and their corresponding desires, Plato often implies that each part, by its nature, pursues a characteristic type of object. Where the appetites are concerned, many of the examples given suggest that they are to be construed as biological urges for food, drink or sex, or at least as desires for bodily pleasures more generally.[7] Because such pleasures are procured by money, the appetitive part is sometimes called the money-loving or gainloving part (581a6-7 & 586d5). This choice of name underscores the fact that Plato characterises it in terms of its objects. The same goes for spirit: at a number of places, it is called the Ôvictory-lovingÕ and Ôhonour-lovingÕ part, and those dominated by it characteristically make victory and honour their goals (550b6-7, 553b7-d9; 581a9-b3, 586c7-d2). Reason too is associated with the love of learning, and is named accordingly (435e7 , 581b9-10). Notice that this way of characterising the three parts is particularly conspicuous at 580d3ff., a passage in which Socrates reminds Glaucon of the tripartite theory in preparation for the Ž nal arguments in favour of justice. As this is no preliminary sketch of the theory but a summary of its essentials presented to the most sophisticated of SocratesÕ interlocutors, it is safe to assume that the object-orientated approach is central to the tripartite theory. So if the democrat does occasionally aspire after victory and learning, the characteristic objects of the spirited and rational parts, it becomes very difŽ cult to classify all his desires as appetites.
Perhaps we should challenge the claim that, by engaging in political and military pursuits or dabbling in ÔphilosophyÕ, the democrat pursues goals associated with the non-appetitive parts of the soul. To take the case of the spirited part, one might argue that whatever he does on the battleŽ eld (if he ever gets that far) has nothing to do with the love of honour or victory. But this suggestion is undermined by another problem in denying that the democrat only satisŽ es appetites. Is it after all plausible that he has no desires in his spirited part? Spirit was present in his father, the oligarch, but was held Ž rmly in check (553d1-7): it was allowed to honour money-making, so the oligarch would clearly feel surges of pride in successful Ž nancial ventures. Furthermore, there is also a reference at 554e7555a6 to the oligarch having to sti e spirited desires for victory which threaten to assert themselves more widely. In general, Plato is extremely generous about who is capable of feeling spirited desires: children and even animals are included (441a7-b3). So it seems very implausible to say that the democrat does not feel spirited desires of some kind. Once this is granted, it is easy to see that, given his liberal attitude to desire satisfaction, these desires will Ž nd their way into action.
Although this point is clearer for the case of spirit, I think a similar case can be made for the democratÕs rational part. In his father this was allowed to deliberate only about maximising wealth (553d2-4); any other form of intellectual pursuit would have been considered a waste of time (cf. 581d2). Once the plutocentric constraints are lifted, however, it is plausible to assume that the satisfaction of curiosity becomes a goal from time to time. In other parts of the Republic, Plato is happy to allow characters who rank well below the philosopher to pursue some form of intellectual interest.[8]
But if we abandon the attempt to treat all the democratÕs desires as appetites, his place in the series of degenerate characters becomes puzzling. He no longer appears a straightforward compromise between oligarchic and tyrannical tendencies. There are spirited and rational aspects to his life that make him appear an anomaly in the process of degeneration. In particular, these aspects seem to constitute redeeming features that make his position beneath the narrowly appetitive oligarch mysterious.
To Ž nd a way out of this problem, we need to look at another aspect of the distinction between the three types of desire. Aside from the connection with bodily pleasure, another essential feature of the appetites is that they are not based upon considerations about the good. This point emerges almost as soon as the appetites are introduced in the argument for tripartition in book 4: in itself an appetite is just for e.g. drink, not for a good drink.[9] To feel an appetite for something is to pursue it just because it offers one pleasure, not because one independently sees any goodness in it. By contrast, the rational part, at least in the case of the just soul, is able to form a desire for something based on the realisation of its goodness.[10] One may immediately ask how this binary distinction relates to the presence of the third part of the soul, but spirit seems to straddle the divide: when it is functioning properly, it responds to reason with a sense of the rightness of the course of action, for instance – hence its associations with pride, shame, and indignation.[11]
For our purposes, the important point is this. Appetites are by their nature not based on considerations of the good. If it is functioning correctly, reason can and ought to seek the good. Similarly, spirit can and ought to ally itself with the value-judgements of reason. In deviant cases, however, it is possible to have a desire of reason for knowledge, and a desire of spirit for honour, without basing these desires upon considerations of the good. So long as such desires are orientated towards certain kinds of goal – honour or discovery – they can count as spirited or rational.13
This, I would suggest, is the key to understanding the democrat. He is someone who has desires for many different things: parties, exercise, money, victory and discovery. But he just Ôgoes forÕ these different things; they capture his fancy, nothing more; he pursues them all merely because he happens to enjoy them, and not because he independently considers them to be worthwhile.
This allows us to say, as the text so clearly implies, that he does satisfy desires from all three parts of the soul.14 On the other hand, since his spirited and rational desires do not arise from the proper functioning of those two parts, these desires differ radically from their analogues in the just person and the timocrat. In fact, by lacking the evaluative basis underlying the desires of better characters, the democratÕs desires all resemble appetites. His desires for victory or discovery feel to him just as they would if they were desires for a drink. Although his essence is not appetitive, it is quasi-appetitive. This explains why all the objects of his pursuit appear to him on a par. He would put a momentÕs conversation with Socrates in the same category as the satisfaction of an unnecessary appetite.
ch. 13; also Penner (1971). But there is no evidence that rational and spirited desires necessarily involve reference to the good. Also, as I have said, we should not underestimate the importance of the fact that Plato so frequently differentiates the types of desire by referring to their characteristic objects. He makes no explicit mention of whether a desire is based on the good when he comes to sum up the main points of the tripartite distinction in 580d3ff.; rather, he concentrates on the types of objects pursued by the different parts.
13              Recall that animals and children have spirited desires.
14              As I said above, there are no explicit statements that the senior democrat is essentially appetitive. Plato certainly thinks that the distinction between necessary and unnecessary desires is crucial to understanding the transition from oligarch to democrat; he also analyses the junior democrat as appetitive. But none of this con icts with the claim that eventually the character satisŽ es desires from all parts of the soul. True, when he reminds us of the democrat in 572b10-d3 and 587c7 he alludes only to the appetitive desires, but this need not be taken to deny the presence of other desires.

3.    A jumble of desires

I now wish to focus directly on the question of why the democrat is placed beneath the oligarch. This is a character who represents a form of vice because he does everything in the service of appetite (even if it is of the best kind), and because the existence of unnecessary but forcibly restrained appetites produces inner con ict. Both these criticisms can be understood in terms of the psychological theory, and are reinforced by the political analogy. When criticising the oligarchic state, Socrates had lost no time in saying that it was ruled by those who lack the relevant qualiŽ cation (551c2-d2). Analogously, the oligarch is ruled by an element inferior to reason. The other criticism of the oligarchic state was that it was a doublestate, divided between rich and poor (551d5-7).
But the oligarch still holds a relatively high position in PlatoÕs series, and this is explained in terms of his redeeming feature, restraint. Through forcible repression, he does at least attain a surrogate for the order that characterises the just person. He represents a simulacrum or shadow of justice. In fact, he espouses a morality of a kind,[12] even though his attitude to virtue is superŽ cial and belies his real defect of character, as is shown in his behaviour towards the vulnerable (554c4-9). This superŽ cial virtue also makes the oligarch appear outwardly ordered (554e3-4). I take this to mean that corresponding to his simulacrum virtue is a simulacrum unity, and it is only when we look inside him that we see the underlying con ict in his nature.
When it comes to ranking the democrat below the oligarch, the issue of unity continues to play a crucial role. What is explicitly said to be wrong with him is that he has no order (t‹jiw) or compulsion (Žn‹gkh) in his life (561d5-6). The Ž rst of these claims shows how he differs from the just person in whom harmony of desires produces order and thus unity, the quality that Plato so prizes in state and soul.[13] In having no compulsion in his life either, he abandons even the oligarchÕs surrogate for rational order.[14] His life has become a jumble of desires, and thus he has taken a decisive step beyond his merely bipolarised father. As initially stated, this is a point about the democratÕs life, rather than his soul as such.[15] It is clear, however, that Plato also wants to accuse him of being a disuniŽ ed person when he likens him to the democratic city and calls him Ôa complex man, full of all sorts of characters . . . and ways of livingÕ (561e3-7).[16]In the end, his soul itself has just become a jumble of desires.
That the democrat suffers in some way from disunity is reasonably clear from the text,[17] but to understand the force of the criticism we need to keep the conclusions of section 2 above well to the fore. At Ž rst sight, the fact that the democrat satisŽ es desires from all three parts of his soul might seem to offset the criticism of him as radically disuniŽ ed: he might compensate for the loss of coherence by his occasional forays into the higher realms of reason and spirit. But any redeeming power these desires might have vanishes when we remember that, although his desires are not all appetites, they are all like appetites. Indeed the disunity upon which Plato ultimately focuses is the result of the fact that his life is just a string of good-independent desires and their satisfaction.[18]

4.    Reasoning, unity and the democrat

In this section, I want to probe further into the role that reason plays in the democratÕs life. We have seen how Plato allows him to follow rational desires from time to time. But there is an important question to be asked about whether his reason has any global function – whether it plays any part in shaping his life as a whole. Imagine the oligarchically-reared youth shortly before his slide into democracy. Does Plato present him as reasoning dispassionately about his fatherÕs repressed and frustrated life, and concluding that his own would be much happier if he treated all his desires on a par? If so, we ought to be puzzled by PlatoÕs complaint about the disunity of his life, and even more about the disunity of his soul: on the view just outlined, there is a single deliberating reason which thinks of his life as a whole and imposes a plan upon it; the fragmentation of life and character that Plato talks about would, in this case, only be superŽ cial.
PlatoÕs critique is far more intelligible if we imagine the democrat rather differently: his spontaneous life-style is not the result of a rational decision at all; instead, he is simply led along by whatever desire happens to arise at any one time, and there is little more to his life over and above its being a random series of desires. It is not that he has rationally decided to eschew discriminations between desires; his reason may be so weakened that it is incapable of operating globally and of imposing any direction on his life.
The fact that Plato presents the democrat as radically disuniŽ ed already creates a strong presumption in favour of allowing global reasoning only a minimal role in shaping his life. This would also tie in with the fact that, at the ÔlocalÕ level, his individual desires are not derived from rational evaluation. I now wish to show that there is plenty more evidence in the text to support this, most of which can be found by looking carefully at the way in which each stage of his transformation is described. I shall start, however, by asking how far reasoning about ends is involved in the oligarchÕs life,[19] because PlatoÕs views on moral education elsewhere in the Republic suggest that, if the oligarchÕs own rational part (logistikñn) is in bad shape, the same is likely to apply to his son.

(a) The oligarch in 553a-555 b

There are two points at which Plato explicitly mentions reasoning and the oligarch.[20] The Ž rst comes at 553d1-4:
He makes the rational and spirited parts sit on the ground beneath appetite, one on either side, reducing them to slaves. He wonÕt allow the Ž rst to reason about or examine anything except how a little money can be made into great wealth.
Here the activity of the rational part is conŽ ned to a narrowly instrumental role: the oligarch apparently has a single goal, and the only kind of activity permitted to reason is that which promotes that goal. By specifying the one and only operation allowed to reasoning, Socrates is thereby excluding any other. Here is someone in whom the process of non-instrumental reasoning is stopped dead.[21]
In this passage, Socrates says that reason is made a slave to appetite. It is important to stress that he is not using this metaphor to describe a case of acrasia where reason has made a value-judgement with which appetite con icts. The corruption of reason is deeper. Under the in uence of appetite, it is prevented from reasoning in such as way as to produce judgements that con ict with the goals of the appetitive part.[22]
But here there is a distinction to be made. 553d1-4 certainly implies something about the way in which the activity of the rational part is constrained. But it is a separate question as to whether the value-judgement, Ômoney matters before anything elseÕ, is located in the rational part or in the appetitive. We might suppose that the rational part has become silent on the question of what constitutes his overall goal, and so infer that the value-judgement resides in the appetitive part. Alternatively, reason might form a judgement that wealth is the only ultimate goal, but form it entirely under the in uence of the appetitive part. In 553d3 he says that it is not allowed to reason about (logÛzesyai) or consider (skopeÝn) anything apart from how to make more money out of less. If we take these words to suggest mental effort of some kind,[23] we can allow room for a lower grade of belief formation; the rational part does form a belief about ends, but under the in uence of appetite. It is its reasoning that is conŽ ned to the instrumental sphere.
What is not in dispute between these two interpretations is the fact that reasoning about ends has collapsed by this stage in the decline. Can we choose between them? One approach would be as follows: like all the characters, the oligarch has a conception of the good. Our question, in effect, is whether this is to be housed in the rational or the appetitive part. One might argue that it has to be put in the rational part because appetite is incapable of conceiving of the good: appetite, surely, is Ôgood-independentÕ, as we saw above. This, however, is too quick. Although appetite cannot produce desires based on a conception of the good, this is not to say that it is incapable of having a conception of the good at all. It may be that, as result of desiring or taking pleasure in something, appetite conceives of it as good. If so, the difference between appetite and reason is not that one conceives of the good and the other does not; it lies in the Ôdirection of Ž tÕ: in whether the good provides an independent and antecedent ground for the desire.[24] On this view, then, the value-judgement could still be housed in the appetitive, and the rational part, in its evaluative capacity, could be silenced.[25]
It is in fact extremely difŽ cult to show that the appetitive part cannot form value-judgements and that they must instead be located in the rational part. Perhaps a closer look at book 4 would help to determine the issue. But as far as the overall topic of this paper is concerned, we can safely leave the issue on one side. For the sake of argument, let us assume that the oligarchÕs rational part does house the value-judgement. I shall go on to argue that, even if this is so, and even if the democratÕs belief in the overall value of freedom is housed in the rational part, in his case the functioning of that part is still too minimal to offset the disunity criticism.
Before returning to the democrat, we need to look at one more text concerning reasoning and the oligarch:
He holds [his evil appetites] in check, not persuading them that itÕs better not to act on them or taming them with logos, but by compulsion and fear, trembling for his other possessions (554d1-3).
Here Plato is implicitly drawing a double contrast with the just person. One difference is that the just person calms his appetites, thus producing harmony rather than the con ict that characterises the oligarch. The other is that the just personÕs restraint is achieved by reason: the rational part performs its function of seeing what the good of the whole soul is, and governing in the light of this knowledge. But in 554d1-3 the oligarchÕs reason does not play this role. Instead, his necessary appetites, together with the associated fear that they might not be satisŽ ed, turn out to be stronger and more intense than his non-necessary appetites.[26] That necessary appetites, rather than reason, should be the cause of his restraint Ž ts with the use of the state-soul analogy: the state is run by a clique of greedy plutocrats (the analogues of necessary appetites), not of misguided intellectuals.
So both these texts, 553d1-4 and 554d1-3, tell strongly against the view that the oligarch is someone whose pursuit of money is grounded in an autonomous decision of the rational part. His day-to-day choices restraining unnecessary appetites do not involve evaluative reasoning and, even if his overall choice of ends is somehow housed in the rational part, it is not maintained by rational re ection.

(b) The junior democrat

Let us now turn to the Ž rst stage of the democratic transition, the total rejection of oligarchic restraint, to see whether it involves the use of autonomous (though misguided) reasoning. Even before we look at the text in any detail, we can Ž nd two reasons against this view, based on the way in which we have characterised the oligarch.
The Ž rst is that, for Plato, the rational part does not just appear at a certain age of maturation in decent working order; unless it is nurtured by someone whose own rational part is already in a healthy state, it is most likely to be stunted.[27] If the oligarch ÔenslavedÕ his own reason and limited it to instrumental deliberation, how could it come to be so healthy in his son? Plato admits the possibility, but thinks it very unlikely to be realised (558b3).
Second, if the democratÕs transformation were the result of renewed functioning of the rational part, it is again unclear why he is put so low on the list, lower than the oligarch. Our principal question is how the unity criticism is supposed to work if the democratÕs decision is underpinned by the activity of the rational part. But a ÔrationalÕ democrat would have another advantage over his father. Although he might sometimes choose to follow worse appetites than his father, the rational part would have control, and so he could be persuaded out of his choice.[28]
If we now look at the text in more detail, we can Ž nd further evidence against allowing a global function to reason. The transition is decribed as follows. Making heavy use of the state-soul analogy, Socrates describes how internal and external elements work together to tempt the youth to give up the restraint of his unnecessary desires, just as a democratic faction within a city might plot revolution with the aid of an outside democratic power:
. . . doesnÕt the young man change when one party of his desires receives help from external desires that are akin to them and of the same form? (559e5-7)
At Ž rst, the oligarchic forces, both within and without, resist the pressures. In other words, the encouragement of family and servants, as well as the restraint imbued in him by his upbringing, quells the rising tide of unnecessary desires within him. But after subsiding, they grow strong again and Ž nally, with the help of the Ôlotus-eatingÕ friends, bring about the revolution that failed before.
The actual transformation is described at 560a9-561a4. In secret, the former desires breed a multitude of others and make another attempt, this time successful, on the young manÕs soul. The next result of this victory is that false beliefs become established and then, if any of the old oligarchic allies try to re-establish control, he is said not even to give them a hearing (560c6-d1). He refuses to engage in any kind of dialogue.
This passage offers three further reasons against supposing that his rational part is active in the revolution. One is that the initial pressure is exerted by unnecessary appetites, from within and without. Plato goes out of his way to stress the role of the appetitive part in the process by talking not of the associates themselves bringing about the change, but their desires (559e5-7). There is also an argument from silence: in the actual transformation, no mention is made of any deliberation, and his associates are at no point said to win him over by argument. If there were any reasoning going on here, it is extremely strange that Plato makes no mention of it, or attempt to describe what it is like.
Finally, we need to pay close attention to the use of the state-soul analogy. It is very noticeable that Plato keeps appealing to the model of a democratic revolution to help explain the transformation of the democratic man. Since he is so keen to highlight the analogy, any interpretation of the passage needs to ensure that its account of the individualÕs transformation Ž nds a clear analogue in some aspect of the political revolution. By presenting the transformation non-rationally, we are able to do this: it is the unnecessary appetites, as the surrogates for the democratically-minded rebels, who do the work of expelling the old rulers. By contrast, it is difŽ cult to see how the ÔrationalÕ interpretation can make much sense of the analogy at all. The problem in fact would apply every time one tried to make the transformation of a character a rational process. The rational part would have to be reintroduced at each transition to hand over power to another part, like an authority stepping in to take power from one faction and give it to another. So in the case of the democratic man, one would have to imagine some authority that thought the city would go better if it was allowed a spell of democracy (at the same time reserving the right to change its mind and try out another constitution). But the way in which Plato actually uses the analogy is completely different, and simpler: one faction yields to another directly.[29]
Now Plato does talk of false lñgoi and opinions siezing the citadel of the young manÕs soul (560c2-3). But this happens only once the desires have paved the way and, again, there is nothing in the text to support the idea that reasoning about ends is taking place. In fact, the way the lñgoi are described at 560c7-d1 as not even prepared to listen to another viewpoint helps rule out this idea. Instead, the formation of these beliefs should be compared to the way in which the oligarch held value-judgements, perhaps housed in his rational part, by the strength of (necessary) appetites. Similarly, the democrat now values freedom, and also has a list of virtues to accord with this (560d2-561a4). Again, even if these value-judgements are housed in the rational part, they do not arise from its autonomous functioning, but from a process of non-rational belief formation.[30]

(c) The senior democrat

The second stage of the democratÕs transformation is described at 561 a8-b3:
If heÕs lucky, and his frenzy doesnÕt go too far, when he grows older, and the great tumult within him has spent itself, he welcomes back some of the exiles, ceases to surrender himself completely to the newcomers, and puts his pleasures on an equal footing.
The starting-point for this change is the calming of his passions. Notice that there is no suggestion that this is the result of the rational part soothing the appetites; all we are given as causes are age and good fortune.
As a result of this change, he starts to gratify a much wider range of desires than before. On my interpretation, what has happened is simply that the new tranquillity allows other pleasures, which would previously have appeared colourless, to make an impression on him. He follows the modiŽ ed lifestyle simply because a wider range of things now appeals to him. On the ÔrationalÕ interpretation, on the other hand, the point would have to be that the new state of calm allows a previously distracted reason to recover and deliberate towards a modiŽ ed life-style. Again, however, there is good evidence against supposing that any substantive activity of the rational part is involved in this transformation.
As before, there is an argument from silence. If the rational part suddenly kicks into activity, why does Plato not mention it? After all, it would be a crucial psychological difference between the stages of the democrat. Furthermore, the suggestion that this character now reasons towards his ends makes him a substantial improvement on his father, so that the ranking question is once again thrown open: if, unlike the oligarch, he does allow his rational part to deliberate about ends, and does not enslave it to non-rational desire, he is far more amenable to persuasion and only needs to be presented with the right arguments.
Finally, we need to bear in mind PlatoÕs views on education and the development of character. In the previous section, I asked how the junior democrat could have developed an autonomous rational part given PlatoÕs
or grief (413b9-10); also, they might be bewitched by pleasure or fear (c1-3). To put the point in terms of the theory of the tripartite soul, beliefs can be formed by the strength of desires in the non-rational parts, especially the appetitive. So, for instance, if one started with a view about something being one of oneÕs ends, this might be Ôdriven outÕ by excessive appetite. See also 429c5ff., esp. 430a6-b2. On the signiŽ cance of these passages to the Republic as a whole, see Scott (1999).
strictures about the need for someone else to nurture it carefully. He also believes that yielding to appetite not only strengthens it, but weakens reason, enslaving it to appetite (442a4-b3 & 588e3-589a2). A consequence of this is that yielding to appetite in oneÕs youth will affect the state of oneÕs reason later on. This makes it improbable that, after giving himself over to each and every appetite in his youth, the democratÕs reason will thereafter be in any position to reassert itself.
So if we take into account his lack of rational education and subsequent bout of appetitive indulgence, by the time we get to his mature phase, his capacity to reason about ends has been irretrievably weakened. He may Ž nd himself experiencing all kinds of desire, but will have neither the ability nor the inclination to discriminate between them; he has become pathologically indiscriminate.
As with the oligarch and the junior democrat, I am not denying that the senior democrat has a conception of the good (freedom) and a policy of eschewing discrimination (561b7-c4), which may be housed in the rational part. Nevertheless, these are not principles arrived at by the activity of that part, which is by this point in too weakened a state to function autonomously. Rather, they result from the fact that he is no longer capable of discrimination and are merely made to suit (or ԏ atterÕ) the state that his desires have now reached.[31]
* * *
In the earlier part of this paper, I argued that the democratic character should not be seen as essentially or exclusively appetitive. He is, however, Ôquasi-appetitiveÕ, which in turn helps to explain how Plato is able to present him as a rabble of desires, someone in whom order and unity have all but disintegrated. I then raised the question of what role reason might play in shaping his life. If the disunity criticism is to hold, Plato ought to allow very little global reasoning. With a more detailed examination of the text, we saw that this was conŽ rmed by three points in particular – PlatoÕs failure to mention any global evaluative reasoning, his views on the development of character and his use of the state-soul analogy. All these point towards the same conclusion: what the democrat chooses to do is determined just by the strength of the desires that he happens to have. There is no unity underlying his manifold lifestyle, because there is no longer sufŽ cient reasoning power to provide it.[32]

Clare College, Cambridge

References Adam, J. (1963) The Republic of Plato. 2 vols. 2nd. edn. Cambridge
Annas, J. (1981) An Introduction to PlatoÕs Republic. Oxford
Cooper, J. M. (1984) ÔPlatoÕs theory of human motivationÕ, History of Philosophy Quarterly 1: 3-21
—— ed. (1997) Plato, Complete Works. Indianapolis
Cross, R. C. & Woozley, A. D. (1964) PlatoÕs Republic. London
Frede, D. (1996) ÔPlato, Popper, and historicismÕ, Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 12: 247-76 Irwin, T. (1977) PlatoÕs Moral Theory. Oxford
—— (1995) PlatoÕs Ethics. Oxford
Lee, E. N., Mourelatos, A. D. P. & Rorty, R. M. eds. (1973) Exegesis and Argument. Phronesis Suppl. I
Kraut, R. (1973) ÔReason and justice in PlatoÕs RepublicÕ, in Lee, Mourelatos & Rorty eds. (1973) 207-24
Reeve, C. D. C. (1988) Philosopher-Kings: The Argument of PlatoÕs Republic. Princeton
Penner, T. (1971) ÔThought and desire in PlatoÕ, in Vlastos ed. (1971) 96-118
Scott, D. (1999) ÔPlatonic pessimism and moral educationÕ, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 17: 15-36
Sorabji, R. (1993) Animal Minds and Human Morals: the Origins of the Western Debate. Cornell
Vlastos, G., ed. (1971) Plato. Vol. II. New York
White, N. (1979) A Companion to PlatoÕs Republic. Oxford


[1] Sometimes the oligarchÕs goal appears to be the maximisation of wealth, at others the satisfaction of necessary desire. I take it that Plato means to explain the former in terms of the latter: wealth provides the security against being unable to satisfy necessary desires.
[2] 571b4-572b8. The examples of actions corresponding to lawless desires include bestialism and incest.
[3] 561b3-5. Translations of the Republic are by G. M. A. Grube, rev. C. D. C. Reeve in Cooper (1997).
[4] True, in  itting between his different pursuits he is said to be giving in to any ¤piyumÛa that arises (561c7), and this is the word that Plato sometimes uses to refer to the desires of the appetitive part (cf. 439d7). But each part of the soul has its own desires, and the word ¤piyumÛa can be used broadly to refer to all such desires in general (cf. 580d8).
[5] For a robust statement of the claim that the democratÕs desires are all appetites, see Cooper (1984) 9 with n. 13. White (1979) 216 attributes to him desires of all three kinds. Reeve (1988) seems to join White by saying that the democrat is not always ruled by the appetitive (156-7; cf. 47), although elsewhere (257) he describes the democratic psyche as Ôruled by nonlawless unnecessary appetitesÕ.
[6] Cooper (1984) 11-12 attempts to see his dabbling in philosophy as the satisfaction of an appetite.
[7] See e.g. 436a10-b1, 439d1-8 & 580d11-581a1.
[8] 495c8-496a10, for instance, alludes to people who dabble in what they take to be philosophy. I agree with Cooper (1984) 5-6 that for Plato the desire to know is present in everyone to some extent and in some form.
[9] See 438a1ff. with Adam (1963) I 250-1 & White (1979) 124-5.
[10] 441c1-2 & 442c5-8.
[11] It has been proposed that the issue of whether a desire is based on the good is the underlying rationale for the tripartite distinction. See Irwin (1977) 192-3 & (1995)
[12] This is clear from a later passage, in which his son is said to repudiate what his father would regard as virtues (560d2-6). Predictably, these include temperance and moderation.
[13] See e.g. 443c9-444a2, esp. 443e1 & 520a3-4.
[14] Cf. 561d5 with 554c1 & d2.
[15] Cf. 561d5- e 2.
[16] This claim, that the democratic man embodies all sorts of characters, goes well beyond saying that he fulŽ lls all sorts of desires. Taken literally, it implies that the democratic man veers between one character and another (timocratic, for instance, then oligarchic), as if he were the victim of a multiple personality disorder. I assume this part of PlatoÕs description is a joke: such radical  ux is incoherent on his view of character as something developed over the long-term. The point is rather that the democrat, in  itting between his desires, mimics the other characters. Plato makes an analogous exaggeration in saying that the democratic state is full not just of different types of citizens, but also of constitutions (557d8). Again, we should not take him mean the democratic state is literally an oligarchy one day, a timocracy the next.
[17] See Annas (1981) 302.
[18] When it comes to diagnosing the democrat, Plato focuses primarily upon his internal state rather than on the kinds of action he performs. This is to be expected from 443c9ff. Nevertheless, although it is the oligarch who is accused of such things as abusing orphans (554c7-9), there is nothing to rule out something similar with the democrat; he would just do so more erratically.
[19] This question could be asked of any of the four deviant characters, all of whom are presented as undergoing the personal analogue of a political revolution and as making a global change to their life-styles. Despite the importance of the issue, it is not often discussed. One exception is Irwin (1994) esp. 286 who argues that reasoning about ends is heavily involved in the lives and attitudes of all four characters.
[20] As I am interested in the oligarchÕs in uence on his son, I shall focus not upon his own transformation from timocracy, but on the activity and strength of his rational part once he is settled into the oligarchic character.
[21] Kraut (1973) 212-3 discusses this passage, and takes it to show merely that appetite has taken what he calls Ônormative controlÕ over reason, i.e. that the oligarch prefers wealth above all else. But Plato is saying more than this: he is talking about what reason is allowed to reason about, not just what the person values.
[22] Flattering the appetitive part is said to be typical of a weak rational part at 590c3-6.
[23] Like logÛzesyai, skopeÝn is regularly used to imply a deliberation of some kind, as at 553e4.
[24] I am grateful to John Cooper for clarifying this point for me.
[25] For the suggestion that there can be value judgements in the appetitive part, see Rep. 442c10-d1 & Phaedr. 255e4-256a1 with Sorabji (1993) 10-11.
[26] In saying that the oligarch does not persuade himself with reason, I am only talking of reasoning about ends. In assessing the Ž nancial risks of yielding to unnecessary desires, he will of course use instrumental reasoning. I also assume that instrumental reasoning would play an important role in his attempts to warn his son away from licentiousness (559e9-10).
[27] See, for instance, 558b1-c1 & 591a1. This, of course, is the thesis behind so many of PlatoÕs proposals for moral education.
[28] On this compare Aristotle N.E. 1146a31-4.
[29] Irwin (1994) 287, in defending the rational interpretation, admits to having difŽ culties with the analogy: Ô. . . one aspect of the political analogy has to be modiŽ ed . . .Õ. This concession is somewhat understated: there is a radical difference between PlatoÕs use of the analogy and IrwinÕs ÔmodiŽ cationÕ which reintroduces reason at each stage as a transitional authority.
[30] The phenomenon of non-rational belief formation has already featured in the Republic and re-appeared more than once. At 412b8ff., Socrates addresses the problem of ensuring that the trainee guardians retain the beliefs inculcated into them by their education. This leads on to a discussion of the ways in which beliefs can be changed. One of these is that someone can be forced to relinquish a belief out of pain
[31] In allowing for this type of evaluation at the global level, we should also think of the democratÕs individual or ÔlocalÕ desires. In section 2, I said that none of these are derived from independently conceived evaluations. This does not exclude the possibility that his desires are accompanied by some form of evaluation. He may conceive of something as good merely from taking pleasure in it. In this way, each of his desires might seem good to him, each as good as any other. (This is perhaps suggested by 561c4.) Nevertheless, if value-judgements do accompany his desires in this way, it is crucial to remember that they are not the source of his desires, but their products.
[32] Earlier versions of this paper were given to the Philosophy Departments of Pittsburgh and Trinity College Dublin, and to the 1998 Princeton Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy. I would like to thank all those who made comments and especially John Cooper,
Vasilis Politis, Christopher Rowe, Susan SuavŽ Meyer and my commentator at the Princeton Colloquium, Rosslyn Weiss. I am also grateful for the support of the Center for Hellenic Studies, Washington D.C.