INTRODUCTION
Ghana
is located sub of the Sahara and precisely in the West Africa region. It was a
former colony of the British and was popular for its agitation against colonial
rule and subsequently became the first black African country south of the
Sahara to gain her independence.
After
independence the country’s economy was neither bad nor rosy because the
colonial government had ripped most of the country’s natural resources off for
their personal gain with much emphasis on gold, diamonds, cocoa, timber and
palm oil etc. The country had also been left too much dependent on its colonial
masters in all spheres of its policy making structures which included
political, economic and social, making it very difficult for the country to
make a quick economic take off. For instance although the country gained her
independence in 1957, it was not until 1960 that it finally got it republic
status.
The
economy of Ghana has faced several distortions and hardship since it colonial
masters left it shores to give way for the citizens to take control and
administration of the country. The first president Dr Kwame Nkrumah expressed
after independence that after political independence comes economic colonialism.
It is quite unfortunate that rather than growth and prosperity, the country
backslided hugely in its economic and financial spheres like high un-payable
foreign debt, poverty, unemployment etc leading to political instability and
several undemocratic regimes.
In
most cases and instances when the economy begins to face stagnation and
difficulties the military take up arms and overthrow the incumbent civilian
government. Most military governments that have come to power in Ghanaian
politics have attributed their reason for assuming power to the bad Shape of
the economy and have resulted to increase in poverty.
Military
interference in Ghanaian politics has not been going pretty well for the
Ghanaians and the economy itself because they have always brought mass
corruption and undemocratic rule in the country putting fear into the public
folk anytime they assume power. They have also played a massive role in
bringing the economy into shambles. Since lack of expertise and knowledge of
good governance is evident in their rule, it is gradually manifested in the way
the country is run. As such a stop to their interference in governance will be
much appreciated by most Ghanaians and the world at large.
The
thrust of this paper therefore is to evaluate the role of the military in the
development of Ghana, using the political development theory.
CONCEPTUAL
CLARIFICATION
According to AnkieHoogewelt ‘Development is a process of induced economic
growth, of a social change in an internally stratified world’ (Kalu, &Nwogwugwu, 2010)
According to Walter
Rodney ‘Development is an overall social process which is dependent upon
increased capacity of members of a society to master the laws of nature (that
is science) and apply such laws in the production of tools (that is technology)
with which they can control their environment to meet their immediate and
future needs. It cannot be seen purely as an economic affair because other
segments of the society are also involved’. (Kalu, &Nwogwugwu, 2010)
According to Claude Ake ‘Development is a systematic and
continuous increase of man’s capabilities for mastering his environment satisfy
basic human needs and for realizing his potentials’. (Kalu, &Nwogwugwu, 2010)
THEORITICAL FRAMEWORK
This
research will be conducted with the use of the political development theory.
Political
Development theory as proposed by Samuel Huntington in his book “Political
order in Changing Societies”(1968) explains that in most developing nations or
the ‘New Nations’ that is countries that have gained independence in the recent
past faces a problem of Political development stagnation as compared to the
economic development in these same countries. It stresses that political
institutions are not really developed to a stage of incorporating majority of
the country in political participation. Instead political participation
includes urban dwellers, listeners of radio, and many others as well as the
literate. These people pressurize the government of the day to make changes in
the institutions and activities of the political atmosphere. According theorists,
these demand causes political tensions in these developing countries. “Social
mobilization also brings about a change in the quality of politics, by changing
the range of human needs that impinge upon the political process”. According to
the theory people who have undergone changes in physical and intellectual
environment tend to have a dying taste for new forms of needs and wants. (Ekeh,
2001)
These
societies try to change its traditional governmental structures and
institutions to suit the western forms and types of government which it’s
believed to be the only key to address such needs of developing societies. As a
matter of fact transformation from traditional forms of government to the
western type is bound to face many problems. This is because the western
countries that were successful in achieving this type of government had
practiced it for decades and centuries before it became stabilized, accepted,
popular and successful. Unfortunately developing countries of today want to
follow this trend but with a short cut process hoping to achieve success which
is not possibly practicable. So developing countries will definitely have
problems of supplying and meeting the growing demands because the expertise,
experience and processes that the western countries have graduated through have
not been followed by these developing countries. As such there is bound to be
political tensions and political instability in most of these countries. (Ekeh,
2001)
These
states have also been afflicted with weak institutions which cannot engage and
control conflicts internally and these demands overrun the government
administration making it impossible to run the country properly therefore attracting
military take over.
The
theory also explains that states that inherited these western forms of
government from colonial masters and were not conversant with them since they
were new to them unlike their traditional forms that they were used to. Also as
former colonies they “inherited patrimonial and clientelistic administrations
that lacked sufficient adaptability, complexity, autonomy and coherence to rule
effectively”. These civilian governments of the new states practiced
factionalized multiparty regimes which as a result brought diverse regimes and
governments with confliction ideas and policies that did not make it possible
for a smooth running government policy but rather created political adversaries
and stalemates. Apart from that the
military in these states lacked professionalism and intervened anytime the civilian
governments failed to meet the demands of the people. Also these military
regimes enacted policies that also encouraged more successive coups in these
new states. (Kwaku, 2008)
The
theory explains that social mobilization occurs when governments of developing
countries are not able to meet growing demands of the society. This is because
these developing countries have borrowed forms of governments which are new and
unfamiliar to their native or traditional types of governments or political
Institutions which they have practiced over centuries ago to some stage of
perfection. Adding salt to injury these developing countries are hoping to
achieving success in practicing these forms of governments which were
transferred to them from their colonial master or are to be followed as
prerequisites for financial support. (Kwaku, 2008)
Analysing
from this theory Ghana also encountered such problems with the practice of such
borrowed forms of government. Politically active with the education they have
about how western countries practicing this government system turn to benefit
it citizens. This political awareness makes them agitate for better policies
for their interest through political legitimate actions which they have learnt
like strikes, demonstration etc. The theory also makes it clear that as former
colonies most of these states have very weak political and civil institutional
systems making them vulnerable and not able to control and regulate such social
unrest. These unrest and social mobilization calls for the military due to the
‘overload’ and spill over effect as the theory explains and the military
capitalise on these unrest to also achieve its demands it had anticipated since
they are also affected by policies of civilian governments in some way. (Kwaku,
2008)
Developing
countries in these years explained above, had much weak political institutions
and a high social unrest and participation turnout. These are confirmed by the
public sensation in the aftermath of military coups which is welcomed by the
masses and society hoping to get their demands solved. Ghana and most
developing countries like Somalia and Egypt have not practiced western forms of
governments of democracy and its related policies for long to be able to
decipher how to encounter associated problems as the theory explains. These
countries begun to practiced democracy in just the recent past 1950s to 60s.
Due to the inexperience developing countries will continue to face Social
Mobilization and unrest till much experience are learnt from it, in order to
make its political institutions and system well established and strong enough
to face the difficulties and challenges when they set in.
A BACKGROUND TO
MILITARY INTERVENTION IN THE GHANAIAN POLITICS
On 6 March 1957 Ghana achieved independence - again, the
first British colony in Africa to do so - with Osagyefo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah as
its first Prime Minister. On 1st July, 1960 it became a republic with Kwame
Nkrumah as its first President. (Ghana Web, 1994)
Ghana spearheaded the political advancement of Africa and
Dr. Nkrumah laid the foundations for the unity later expressed in the formation
of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). He was a firm supporter of the
Commonwealth and the Non-Aligned movement. (Ghana Web, 1994)
Immediately
after independence, the Nkrumah government initiated a socialist experiment in
which major social gains were made in education, health and housing sectors.
Unfortunately, however, these positive domestic gains were undermined when teh
government initiated an aggressive Pan African foreign policy based on teh
two-pronmged approach of African Decolonisation and Unity. While the
decolonisation schemes were very successful, the Nkrumahist approach to African
Unity was seen by his colleagues as too ambitious and was thus shelved for a
more conservative and loose continetal organisation.
By the time Nkrumah was carrying out his grandiose schemes, the UGCC which had never reconcilled itself to the fact that an ‘upstart’ political novice had beaten them to what they saw as their natural rights – the ascension to political office – started agitating for seccession from Ghana. Concomitantly, the economy of Ghana was progressively being undermined. Finally, the military staged Ghana's first coup d’état in February 1966.
By the time Nkrumah was carrying out his grandiose schemes, the UGCC which had never reconcilled itself to the fact that an ‘upstart’ political novice had beaten them to what they saw as their natural rights – the ascension to political office – started agitating for seccession from Ghana. Concomitantly, the economy of Ghana was progressively being undermined. Finally, the military staged Ghana's first coup d’état in February 1966.
On 24th February 1966, the government of Dr. Nkrumah was
overthrown by the Ghana armed forces and the police. A National Liberation
Council (NLC), headed by Lt. General Joseph Arthur Ankrah, was formed to
administer the country. (Ghana Web, 1994)
General Ankrah was removed from office in April 1969 and Lt.
General Akwasi Amankwa Afrifa became the Chairman of the NLC, which later gave
way to a three-man Presidential Commission with General Afrifa as chairman. The
Commission paved the way for a general election in 1969 which brought into
power the Progress Party government, with Dr. Kofi Abrefa Busia as Prime
Minister and Mr. Edward Akufo Addo as president.
The Ghana armed forces again took over the reins of government
on 13th January 1972, and Colonel (later General) Ignatius Kutu Acheampong
became the Head of State and Chairman of the National Redemption Council (NRC).
The name of the NRC was later changed to the Supreme Military Council (SMC).
General Acheampong was replaced by General F.W.K. Akuffo in a palace coup in
July 1978. (Ghana Web, 1994)
The SMC was overthrown on 4th June
1979, in a mass revolt of junior officers and men of the Ghana armed forces.
Following the uprising, an Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) was set up
under the chairmanship of Flt.-Lt. Jerry John Rawlings. The AFRC carried out a
house-cleaning exercise in the armed forces and society at large, while
restoring a sense of moral responsibility and the principle of accountability
and pro- bity in public life. The AFRC was in office for only three months and,
in pursuance of a programme already set in motion before the uprising, allowed
general elections to be held. On 24th September 1979, the AFRC handed over
power to the civilian administration of Dr. Hilla Limann, leader of the
People's National Party which had won the elections.
In the wake of the continuing downward plunge of the coun-
try, the Limann administration was overthrown on 31st December 1981, ushering
in a new revolutionary era of far-reach ing reforms and rehabilitation at all
levels. Flt.-Lt. Rawlings became the Chairman of a nine-member Provisional
National Defence Ruling Council, (PNDC) with Secretaries of State in charge of
the various ministries being responsible to the PNDC .
Immediately on assumption of office, the PNDC set up a
National Commission for Democracy (NCD) charged with for- mulating a programme
for the more effective realisation of true democracy. The government of the
PNDC also provided for the establishment of elected District Assemblies to
bring local government to the grassroots.
In 1990, the NCD, at the prompting of the PNDC, organised
forums in all the 10 regions of the country at which Ghanaians of all walks of
life advanced their views as to what form of government they wanted. These
views were collated and analysed by the NCD whose final report indicated that
the people want ed a multi-party system of government.
This led to the appointment of a Committee of Experts to
draw up constitutional proposals for the consideration of a Consultative
Assembly. The Assembly prepared a draft constitution based on proposals
submitted to it by the PNDC, as well as previous constitutions of 1957, 1969
and 1979, and the report of the Committee of Experts. The final draft
constitution was unanimously approved by the people in a referendum on April
28, 1992.
Among other things, the Constitution provides for an
Executive President elected by universal adult suffrage for a term of four
years and eligible for re-election for only one addi- tional term. In the
presidential elections held on November 3, 1992, Flt.-Lt- Rawlings who stood on
the ticket of the National Democratic Congress (NDC), garnered 58.8% of the
3,989,020 votes cast to beat to second place his closest rival Prof. Albert Adu
Boahen representing the New Patriotic Party who polled 30.4% of the votes.
Other contestants for the presidency were former president Dr. Hilla limann of
the People's National Convention (6.7%), Mr. Kwabena Darko of the National
Independence Party (2.8%) and Lt-Gen. Emmanuel Erskine representing the
People's Heritage Party (1.7%). (Ghana Web, 1994)
In the parliamentary elections held on December 29,1992, the
Progressive Alliance made up of the National Democratic Congress, the National
Convention Party and the Egle Party won 198 seats out of a total of 200, within
the Alliance the NDC won 189 seats, the NCP had 8, the Egle Party 2, and
Independents 2. Four parties - the NPP, PNC, NIP and PHP - boycotted the
parliamentary elections, dissatisfied with the proposed election strategy.
The Fourth Republic was inaugurated on January 7, 1993 with
the swearing-in of Flt. Lt. Rawlings as President and his running mate, Mr.K.N.
Arkaah as Vice President. The newly elected Parliament was opened on the same
day and elected, Mr. Justice D.F. Annan as Speaker. (Ghana Web, 1994)
AN
EVALUATION ON THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF GHANA
Making
an evaluation of the role of the military in the development of Ghana denotes
how the military has positively developed the Ghanaian nation or underdeveloped
Ghana. Thus with series of military coups during the post colonial era this
paper sets to analyze the failure and success of the military in the
development of Ghana.
THE ROLE OF THE
MILITARY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF GHANA
Although Ghana enjoyed a privileged position
in the post-colonial era due to a relatively stable regime with a charismatic
leader committed to soliciting international financial support, profitable
natural endowments, and a comparatively high stock of human capital. Thus on
the long run, the development of Ghana was stunted due to corruption and
regular economic crises and primitive accumulation of wealth by the petit and
comprador bourgeois which led to frustration and a quest for change by the
citizens. Thus leading to a coup by ten-member Armed Forces
Revolutionary Council (AFRC) consisting of junior officers led by Flight
Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings overthrew the SMC government in 1979. Thus the flash
point of the study will be the Jerry Rawlings regime from 1979 to 1993, in
accordance to other military regimes in Ghana.
The Development and
Mobilization of the Economy and Natural Resource of Ghana
In
August 1983, the Economic Recovery Program (ERP) initiated by the PNDC generated
support from the IMF and World Bank, which gave $611 million and $1.1 billion
respectively (US Department of State). In addition, Rawlings himself actively
solicited at least five billion dollars from Western donors who approved of his
economic reforms. This provided an
environment within which economic growth
steadily returned and could then be sustained, based in part on a process of
building effective institutions in the area of economic governance and with a
high level of both support and pressure from international donors. The most
visible institutional example of this has been the Bank of Ghana, which has
received the high levels of political protection and technical
capacity-building required to help deliver the conditions for macroeconomic
stability and improved economic productivity. A different but equally
illuminating exemplar of how Ghana’s political settlement plays out in terms of
development institutions is COCOBOD (the Ghana Cocoa Board). Although political
protection and capacity-building also helped COCOBOD to achieve high levels of
productivity for Ghana’s main export crop, this involved defying IFI pressures
to liberalize, with some critical observers noting that the country’s political
and economic elite (many of whom come from cocoa-growing regions) were
particularly predisposed to ensuring that cocoa was protected. Rawlings and the
PNDC through the ERP significantly increased foreign debt. The ERP, developed
by the PNDC under the guidance of the World Bank and IMF, consisted of three
main phases. First, the government intended to minimize expenditures as a means
to alleviate pressures on the banking sector, improve tax collection, create
incentives for production, and devalue the cedi. Second, the government sought
to privatize state-owned enterprises, further devalue the cedi, and eliminate
the black market for currency exchange. Third, the government planned to
intensify monetary reforms and reduce private corporate taxes in support of the
private sector (Library of Congress Country Studies Index).
The Aid in
Decentralization and Formation of the State Structure of Ghana
The
current system of local government in Ghana is based on a decentralisation
programme that began in 1988 under the quasi-military regime of the Provisional
National Defence Council (PNDC). One of the stated policy objectives of the
1988 decentralization reforms was to give “power to the people” who had been
marginalized in national politics by previous
regimes
(Ayee 1994:124). Accordingly, the PNDC promulgated a new Local Government
Law (PNDC Law 207) with the primary objective of promoting “popular
participation and ownership of the machinery of government by shifting
the process of governance from command to consultative processes, and by
devolving power, competence and resource/means to the district level” (quoted
in Gasu 2006:1). The thrust of the PNDC’s decentralization programme was
explicitly stated in the PNDC Blue
Book as an attempt to
give
“expressions of a fundamental belief of the PNDC that effective participation
in the productivity and development of our society and participation in
political decision making are the responsibilities of all us” (Ghana 1987,
quoted in Ayee 1994:110). Although, successive governments in Ghana since
independence have looked to a vibrant local government system to aid the
country’s development. Attempts at decentralization of power were introduced in
1974 and 1983. Ghana’s current programme of decentralization was initiated in
1988 when the Rawlings government introduced the Local Government (PNDC Law
207), through which the number of local authorities, then 65, was reviewed and
reorganized into 110 district assemblies. The stated aim of the local
government reform was to transfer functions, powers, means and competences from
the central government to the local government, and to establish a forum at the
local level where a team of development agents, representatives of the people
and other agencies could discuss the development problems of the district
and/or area and their underlying causative factors. On an ideological level
decentralization was expected to support democratic participatory governance,
improve service delivery and also lead to a rapid socio-economic development.
The
Achievement of Political Stability and a Viable Political Institution in Ghana
The
achievement of political stability in Ghana is itself a legacy of the earlier
shift in the early 1980s, from a lack of political order to a dominant leader
settlement under the military rule of Rawlings. The effective mobilization of
resources by the Rawlings regime in the past two decades attests to the
institutional advantages of Ghana. The introduction of the PNDC in 1979, and
later, the peaceable transfer of power to the National Democratic Congress
(NDC) in 1992, increased Ghana’s international presence. Moreover, Rawlings
carried out his long-term commitment to democracy by passing a new constitution
in 1992 that freed political prisoners, allowed the formation of political
parties, and articulated an obligation to human rights and free expression (BBC).
Although governmental transparency remains an issue, Ghana is considered one of
the more politically stable countries in comparison to other developing
nations. According to the Center for Global Integrity, Ghana has a moderate
rating in the public integrity index, ranking 13th out of 25 index nations.
This political stability is thus inherently attractive to foreign investors and
critical to sustained economic policy (Gutteridge 1975). .
The Use of Consensus in
the Drafting of Constitution and a Viable Transition to Democracy by the
Military in 1993
The
current Ghanian constitution which is applauded for its attention on the rule
of law, order, and respect for human right was drafted and made by the military
regime in the development of a successful trasitional democracy. Thus in 1991,
the military government of the erstwhile Provisional National Defence Council
(PNDC), unveiled a transitional Programme to return Ghana to a constitutional
democracy. A Committee of Experts was appointed to prepare a draft
constitution for the administration of Ghana. A Consultative Assembly
was set up by PNDC Law 253 to consider the draft constitution. In a referendum
organized on 28th April 1992, the draft constitution was adopted by Ghanaians.
This marked the start of a new process toward an era of liberal democratic
governance. In January 1993, Ghana returned to civilian constitutional rule
after eleven years of military rule. The restoration of constitutional
government occasioned the birth of several democratic institutions. (Dzorgbo, 2001)
ASSESSING THE NEGATIVE IMPACT OF THE MILITARY IN THE DEVELOPMENT
OF GHANA:
Dictatorship, Violation
of Human Rights and the Retainment of Colonial Administration by the Military
Rule in Then Underdevelopment of Ghana
In
Ghana the first military regime took power in 1966 overthrowing the leader
since independence, Kwame Nkrumah. As is much the trend with military coups,
the new administration claimed legitimacy on a list of grievances many of which
were directly related to the resilience of the military. However, the critical
public justification of the coup was the increasingly personalized rule by
Nkrumah, most evidenced by the change of the state to a one-party system in
1964. Nevertheless, upon assuming power, the first military regime and
those which followed continuously took up the same infrastructure and
institutions used by their civilian predecessors and largely remnant from the
colonial rule of oppression Gutteridge (1975). Thus it is no surprise that
Boafo-Arthur argues that all four military regimes which ruled during Ghana
between 1965 and 1990 “trampled and subverted the fundamental rights of the
citizenry” (2005 p. 111). With no institutionalization of good governance and
state power heavily restricted to the head of state, any likelihood of any
inclusive government was wholly dependent on would-be benevolent dictators
(which never emerged). Boafo-Arthur’s further accuses the military regimes of
illegal confiscation of property, purposeful exclusion of the citizenry from
the governance process and of the 1979 extrajudicial killings of three former
heads of state and five high-ranking generals. These killings, ordered by then
president Jerry Rawlings, have been justified as a compromise to those within
the ranks who wanted a bloodbath during the coup (Jeffries 1989, p. 95). That
such an action could be justified on the grounds of compromise speaks volumes
to the brute strength of the military regime in its governance tactics.
Corruption And
Primitive Acquisition Of Public Wealth By The Military Undermined Ghana
Socio-Political Development.
Notably,
however, the actual implementation promised by sequential coup leaders was
sorely lacking. What was consistent, however, was a diversion of public funds
to expanding military interests and redistributing political and economic power
amongst military elites (Decalo 1973, p. 117). In turn, Jefferies characterizes
Ghana as “a highly personalist (or neo-patrimonial) machine, seeking to benefit
individual favourites or networks of clients with varying degrees of concern
for larger social aggregates” (1989, p. 75). While it should be noted that in
Ghana under military rule business men, academics and the press did gain more
freedom, with regards to corruption a best case scenario suggested that petty
bribery and corruption remained endemic (Gutteridge 1975, p. 77).
Meanwhile Decalo argues that the scope of nepotism, corruption and smuggling
all seemed to broaden with military take-over (1973, p. 119). Furthermore, the
military regimes consistently felt threats of counter-coups and indeed Rawlings
enacted one because of the immense economic stagnation (Gutteridge 1975, p.
76). In ultimate, though not necessarily unworthy, pessimism Decalo asserts
that the little socio-political development did occur during the Ghanaian
military regimes was dependent upon the simultaneous increase of personal
benefit to those at the top. In other words, the more elites could accrue, the
more the state would be pushed along its development track, giving further
pause to the motivations behind good governance even considering Ghana’s
current position.
Central Control and Foreign
Institution Influence in the Politics of Ghana
After
Nkrumah’s overthrow in 1966, Ghana experienced political and economic
instability with six changes in government between 1966 and 1981 which stunted
economic growth. With the economy even
deteriorating further, Flt. Lt. Jerry John Rawlings initiated his coup on
December 31, 1981. The abysmal performance of the economy, despite measures put
in place by the 1983 budget, forced the Provincial National Defence Council
(PNDC) government under Rawlings to embrace the IMF and World Bank’s structural
adjustment program as a means to resurrect from economic degeneration. This led
to the end of a Marxist, populist ideology to a more “pragmatic” one and one in
which the political decision is been influenced by the capitalist west
(Dzorgbo, 2001). Thus formulation of policies in devaluation of currency,
political instability in the country, trade liberalizing and infringement of
political sovereignty by the capitalist west could be blamed on the military
regime in the country during this era. Thus this is to the fact that the
Ghanaian polity is blessed with gold, thus the SAP loans made the polity of
Ghana venerable.
CONCLUSION
The
military has played an adverse role in the development of Ghana
socio-politically, economically and other aspects like institutional
development. Through the military regimes especially the Jerry Rawlings administration,
which gave the Ghanaian state its status as one of the most stabilized
countries in West Africa. Thus even with this acclaimed role of the military in
development, the military has also undermined the internal politics and also
through SAP and IMF loans gave foreign institution the ability to penetrate
into her sovereignty, which has present day effects.
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the Politics of the Ghana
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A., Ukeje, C.(Ed.), The Crisis of the State and Regionalism in
West Africa,
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Dzorgbo,
D.B. (2001). Ghana in Search of Development: The Challenge of Governance,
Economic Management, and
Institution Building. Anthony Rowe Ltd:
Decalo, S. (1973). “Military Coups and Military
Regimes in Africa”. The Journal of Modern
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105-127.
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P.P (2001) Theory and Curse of Military
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